Zbornik radova Instituta za savremenu istoriju
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Tokom svoje istorije, ISI je ostvario bogatu izdavačku delatnost objavljujući monografije, tematske zbornike, zbornike građe, periodične publikacije, hronologije i bibliografije. Publikacije izlaze u pet biblioteka: (1) Studije i monografije, (2) Posebna izdanja, (3) Skrivana istorija, (4) Zbornici radova, (5) Dokumenta.
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- Poljska štampa u vreme pruske okupacije o atentatu u Sarajevu i pretnji evropskog rata (jun – avgust 1914. godine)
- Summary/Abstract: The article analyses the position of the Polish press under Prussian Partition in times of the rising threat of war after the Sarajevo assassination and immediately after the outbreak of war. In the Prussian annexation, under difficult conditions of the intensification of national oppression, relatively a lot of Polish newspapers and magazines, representing various political options, were printed. Some of them took a loyalist stance, especially in Upper Silesia –„Głos Śląski” i „Katolik” i „Górnoślązak”, „Kurier Śląski”, also “Gazeta Gdańska” newspaper, published in Pomerania, and – to a lesser extent – „Gazeta Grudziądzka”. Greater Poland (Wielkopolska) was dominated by the anti-German national democratists’ press: „Kurier Poznański”, „Orędownik”, „Dziennik Bydgoski”, „Dziennik Kujawski”, much like in „Gazeta Toruńska” of Pomerania. The information about the assassination at Sarajevo caused a stir in the press. Most newspapers printed special supplements and over the next few days published many details about this crime. In the newspapers the scenarios were widely publicized. In most situations commentators did not predict an escalation of conflict as people became accustomed to the Balkans turbulent history. Most of the Polish newspapers openly sympathized with the Serbs, who just like Poles were subjected to the Austrian political system of “violence and pressure” for years. Most assessments of the causes and consequences of the assassination were linked to parallel situation of Polish lands. Only a few newspapers found the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia partially justified. The opinion that it was unacceptable for a sovereign state predominated and the rejection of ultimatum was predicted. There was the hope for limiting the scale of conflict and effective diplomatic mediation. After the outbreak of the war only some of the newspapers continued to appear and they published, out of necessity, official information and messages. Only some commentators distanced themselves from pro-war sentiments in Germany. Some of the newspapers took a loyalist stance while the others expressed reservations and had attitudes of expectations towards the conflicting sides. The defense of the national identity was the most important thing. Most of the titles did not believe German propaganda: that the Entente countries provoked the war. The press exposed Germany’s imperial ambitions as well as intentions of creating pro-German orientation in the Polish society.
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- Poljske izbeglice u Jugoslaviji 1939–1941. godine
- Summary/Abstract: Among the countries in which Polish citizens found harbourage after German invasion of Poland, started on September 1, 1939, was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia also. After short or long residence period they, mostly, continued the journey to West European countries, France and Great Britain, primarily. Since the start of October 1939, Yugoslavian authorities issued set of announcements and guidelines which regulated the reception and status of Polish refugees. The quote of 1.000 refugees was determined, but it was exceeded. The City of Jagodina was announced as the place of Polish refugee’s residence. Among received refugees was Jewish population, which, together with Jews from Czechoslovakia and Austria, tried to get to Palestine by ships. Some refugees experienced the occupation of Serbia, some of them were interned, but Jewish population was executed together with other Jews in Serbia.
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- Prilozi za istoriju jugoslovensko-poljskih odnosa u Drugom svetskom ratu
- Summary/Abstract: On Yugoslav-Polish relations during the WWII testify several facts. Some of them were the news on situation in Yugoslavia brougth to the Yugoslav Royal Government in Exile by the Poles, then British-Chetniks correspondence related to situation of Polish POW's and Allied Mission members who staid in East Serbia 1943/1944, and how the death of general Sikorsky influenced Tito's stay in Italy during 1944. One could also mention the support of Polish contingent among Allied Troops to the representatives of Chetniks movement in Italy (Živko Topalović and Zvonko Vučković) to establish the radio communications with general Mihailović during the second part of 1944.
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- Rat na Balkanu u „Demonima rata prema Goji“ Vladislava Pašikovskog
- Summary/Abstract: The events in the Balkans after the disintegration of Yugoslavia were not the object of interest for Polish people of culture. One of the most interesting film that refers to those events is „The Demons of War by Goya” directed by Władysław Pasikowski in 1998. The analysis of that film should help to answer some questions: how the topic of the war in the Balkans was presented in certain areas of the Polish culture, and whether the war was really in the centre of interest. Was it treated as an excuse, specific iconographic and cultural background, element of genre conventions? Or was it the object of reflection on war as such and, finally, on the situation in the Balkans? In the context of the film some responses are possible. The author takes into account not only political, historical, and genology contexts, but Wladyslaw Pasikowski`s creativity as well. The aim of this article is, however, not only the analysis of the film itself but also its reception by people.
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- Razgovori između Tita i Gomulke u Varšavi 1964. i u Beogradu 1965. godine
- Summary/Abstract: Conversations between Tito and Gomulka in Warsaw and Belgrade in the middle of 1960s of the past century represented strong impulse to further improvement of Yugoslav-Polish cooperation and good opportunity for detailed exchange of stands related to actual issues in international relations and international labour movement. Even stands of two state officials in a relation to important international issues and centres of world crisis were, almost always, similar, existed several diferences in a perceptionof optimal strategy of socialist countries which led to solution of problems solving, so in a perception of fundamental basis, relations between socialist countries shoulbd be based on. Those differences were reflection of current differences of international positions of two states and several issues which occupied them. Yugoslavia those days was mostly worried because the detente of of two world powers resulted with increased pressure on newliberated, nonaligned countries and successive conflicts among the ones. In those conditions, the interest of non-aligned countries for foundation of Movement of non-aligned countries decreased, which made hard to ensure long term stabilization of Yugoslav international position. In accordance with the situation, Tito tried, during conversations with Gomulka, to get hisenergic support for Yugoslav initiatives in United nations and wider sphere of international relations started with a goal to stabilize situation in Afro-Asian countries, actually, to ensure support of Gomulka to ideas of emancipation in new liberated states of the region. Gomulka, the center of the problem, saw in turbulent times in Europe and renovation of German pretensions to Polish territories. He was worried because of public debates on border between Germany and Poland on Odra and Nisa River issue at the same time when negotiations on foundation of multilateral forces of NATO and supplying of FR of Germany with nuclear weapon were intensified. So, Polish side pointed interest for instrumentalization of initiative of Polish minister of Foreig Affairs, Adam Rapacki, for foundation of nuclear free zone in Central Europe, so for organization of conference attending all European countries, but also USA and USSR, which would finally confirm existing border between Poland and Germany as definite and unchangeable. Having on mind identical stands of two interlocutors and mutual support to foreign policy priorities of both sides, it is possible to say that meetings in Warsaw and Belgrade ended on a pleasure of main participants.
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- Relacje Polsko – Jugosłowiańskie w kontekście współpracy dyplomatycznej w latach 50.-80. XX wieku
- Summary/Abstract: The main research goal of the article titled “Polish and Yugoslav Relations in the Light of the Diplomatic Cooperation in the 50s - 80s of the 20th Century” was to establish Polish and Yugoslav relations on the basis of the criterion of the normative acts which were signed from the 50s to 80s of the 20th century. Thus, it was during the time before the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation when both states belonged to the group of socialist countries. At this place the following questions arise: firstly, what kinds of acts were signed by Poland at that time; secondly, what issues were addressed and thirdly, which decade during the time under the examination was richest in this type of diplomatic cooperation. Answering the first of the posed questions, it is possible to observe the nature of those acts which were mostly bilateral agreements or contracts and consular conventions. As far as the issues of the greatest interest are concerned, the most popular were scientific and cultural cooperation, tourism, transport, agriculture, food industry and generally speaking, the field of social policy. Whereas, in the decade of 50s of 20th century the normative acts were most often concluded.
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- SLIKA NEPRIJATELJA/SAVEZNIKA U SRBIJI 1941– 1944 TRADICIJA, IDEOLOGIJA, STEREOTIPI
- Summary/Abstract: The image of an enemy/ally in Serbia during WWII was created by all three main political and military factors. In the imaging of the enemy, central part had been occupied by Germans, particularly Austrians since the First World War. Such image has been confirmed after the April war, division of the Yugoslavia and mass terror against Serbs. The propaganda of the ocupator, that is to say the directed Serbian propaganda, had a difficult task to replace Germans as enemies with the image of the “World Jew” as a major, universal, that means Serbian enemy, too. According to that NS ideological dogma, the image of domestic enemy, two resistance movement has been created. They were accused as tools in Jewish s (western-plutocratic and eastern-Bolshevik)hands. Two resistance movements, a legitimistic one (Yugoslav Homeland army) and a revolutionary one (the Communist partisans)based their image of the enemy on the tradition of the German enemy, but the partisan movement has modified this image according to its political aims. Essentially different aims and tactics of these two movements, as well as their irreconcilable conflict from November 1941, determined changes in their imaging of the enemy. Both have seen the principal enemy in the other resistance movement. Their military and political activity was subordinated to such a perception. The changes in the balance of power in 1943. and 1944. influenced the credibility of the enemy perception of the two resistance movements. The image created by the victorious partisan movement was a basis for the interpretation of the WWII events throughout entire period of the Communist Yugoslavia.
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- SRBIJA NA KRAJU RATA
- Summary/Abstract: Serbia, as the most important republic of Yugoslavia and „its backbone“, became in 1944 a very important strategic and political region, both for the Allies and for the German war machinery, but especially for the confronted militarypolitical movements within the country, partisans and chetniks. All of them had their own military and political calculations regarding Serbia, and all of them intended to realize their own politics. The interests and relations confronted in that way brought about the battle for Serbia, which became battle for Yugoslavia and its future. In the second half of 1944 decisive military and political events occurred, determining the future of the Yugoslav state. War operations moved from the western to the eastern part of the country, i. e. to Serbia. Partizan forces were transformed from armed guerilla to a real army, armed by the Western Allies and, from summer 1944, heavily supported by Soviets. They became a serious threat for the occupying and rival resistance troops, communications and other targets in this sensitive region. At the same time, as a new regime was being prepared, the rivalry between partisans and chetniks movements continued. The first movement was on the rise, while the second one was in disarray and politically and military discredited. The civil war was fought on with all the collateral cruelties - the ally bombers destroyed communication networks and industrial enterprises, but civilian targets as well, both in agreement with partisan forces, as well as in accordance with their own military strategic plans. Finally, the Ally politics changed, partisans were fully accepted, and chetniks were rejected as allies. The change of this, particularly British, attitude had an important psychological effect. The reputation that chetniks had enjoyed up to that point was transferred to partisans. „Ally support and dispatches brought new volunteers. Better equipped and more numerous partisans could enhance the range of their operations; their success on the battlefield enabled them to capture more weaponry and to enhance their own prestige. So, in several months, partisan movement in Serbia became manifold stronger. Together with defeat and disintegration of chetniks, a monarchist mood in Serbia seemingly disappeared.