Istorija 20. veka
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Journal Istorija 20.veka (History of the 20th Century) is continually published biannually from 1983. Journal considers previously unpublished manuscripts of articles and scholarly contributions whose object is contemporary history of Serbia, former Yugoslavia and the Balkans in European and global context. Articles are expected to be interdisciplinary, based on original archival researches. Journal publishes articles that critically investigate social, cultural, economic and intellectual developments of 20th century. All received manuscripts are a subject to a double-blind external peer review process. In order to be accepted the manuscripts need to be deemed publishable by the editorial board and two anonymous reviewers. Articles are published in Serbian and English, and in other languages should the need arise.
Journal is included in SCOPUS, ERIH PLUS index (European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences), Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL) and Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). According to the categorization of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, since 2015 it carries the category “National Journal of International Importance (M24)”. History of the 20th Century is an Open Access Journal.
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ISSN 0352-3160
eISSN 2560-3647
doi 10.29362/ist20veka
Pages
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- Djelovanje i ustroj mornarice NDH na rijekama
- According to the Rome agreements signed on May 18, 1941 by Benito Mussolini and the head of Independent State of Croatia (ISC) Ante Pavelić, Croatian side had to cede a large part of eastern Adriatic coast to Kingdom of Italy. Rome agreements also stipulated that ISC does not have right to develop navy at the parts of Adriatic coast that remained within the Croatian borders. After German attackon Soviet Union Croatian volunteers joined German and Italian troops fighting on the Eastern front. Croatian naval legion was also formed and it joined the German navy on the Black sea. After the capitulation of Italy in September 1943 Croatian authorities declared Rome agreements null and void and most of the areas annexed by Italians in 1941 were returned to Croatian rule. This opened the opportunity for the development of ISC Navy atthe Adriatic. Unlike Italians before them, Germans were ready to help ISC to establish its naval forces. But because of the difficult situation during the later part of the war ISC Navy at the Adriatic was very limited in its operations. In late 1944 some ISC naval personnel defected to the Tito’s partisans and after that Germans lost confidence in ISC Navy. From 1941 ISC Navyhad port authorities and various commands on Croatian rivers (Danube, Drava and Sava). Its main bases were in Brod na Savi and Zemun. ISC Navy at rivers possessed several patrol boats. During Axis attack on Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941 most of its river boats were scuttled bytheir crews. During 1942 and 1943 some of these boats were salvaged, among them two monitors („Bosna“ and „Sava“), and taken into service of the ISC Navy. Because of the activities of partisan forces operating in Slavonia, Syrmia and Bosnia regular traffic along river Sava was disrupted from 1942 and ISC Navy was not able to control the situation at that river. During 1944 Allied airplanes began laying mines in Sava and one of it hit and sank monitor „Bosna“. In late summer of 1944 Soviet Red army was approaching Croatian border and Marshal Tito issued a call to soldiers of Croatian Home Guardsto join the partisans until September 15 or face consequences as „traitors“. Many Hom Guardsmen deserted their units and joined the partisans. ISC naval personnel in Brod na Savi scuttled monitor „Sava“ and also deserted to partisans. In October 1944 Soviet and partisan forces captured Belgrade and eastern Syrmia, including Zemun. Because of such developments of events ISC Navy at rivers largely ceased to exist already in autumn of 1944, although the war lasted for several more months.
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- Dodele odlikovanja Kraljevine Jugoslavije u emigraciji 1941–1945.
- The paper has explored the decorations of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia awarded by King Peter II and the Yugoslav royal government, living in exile in London and Cairo. It is the prerogative of a sovereign and his government to award decorations, and in an extremely complicated and difficult period we have observed, it had a profound symbolic meaning, too. Not only did they continue to award the decorations, but had the existing medals recoined, while in the fragmented archives contain even a proposal of then army minister, General Dragoljub Mihailović, that a new decoration be produced. During the war, the number of awarded decorations dwindled, especially to the ministers and prominent figures in exile, and the Yugoslav Army in the Middle East, but those issued for protocolar purposes and to reward the bravery of soldiers in the occupied Yugoslavia did not subside in numbers. A decision to decorate a foreign citizen is always a diplomatic move, either civilian or military. In the given period, high-ranking decorations were awarded to the foreigners who helped promote a state propaganda campaign. In a time of war, the army minister was entitled to use his own discretion to nominate for decorations the members of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland for extreme bravery in combat, those killed in action in the first place. When after 1944 political circumstances changed in the country, as well as globally, the Partisan movement awarded their own decorations, with the assistance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having made a clear break with the Kingdom’s decorations. As the war drew to an end, the King in exile instituted the Royal War Cross to be awarded to the exiled members of the Yugoslav Army in the Homeland.
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- Doprinos konferencije u Lusaki 1970. institucionalizaciji saradnje nesvrstanih zemalja i njihovom reaktiviranju u međunarodnim odnosima
- During the 70-ies of the last century, non-aligned countries were undertaking initiatives for the formation of a wide movement. This movement was needed to provide conditions for their continuous and coordinated joint actions in international relations. The turning point in this context was the summit in Lusaka (capital of Zambia). There, for the first time, an agreement was finally reached on the measures that would result in the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement and that would contribute to strengthening the role of non-aligned countries in the United Nations and in the wider sphere of international relations. The countries that participated in the conference in Lusaka agreed that the Non-Aligned Movement must not assume the characteristics of a „third block“. It was supposed to represent a broad and open organization, devoid of any new centers of power and hierarchical organization. Hence, they rejected the suggestions of a group of non-aligned countries to form and solidify the Permanent Secretariat body, in which a decisive role would be played by the host country and a narrower group of the politically most exposed countries. After the conference in Lusaka came a period which was often referred to as the „golden age“ of non-alignment. This name seems appropriate, because this was a time of a sudden branching of institutional mechanisms of cooperation of Non-Aligned Countries and their increasingly widespread and powerful joint participation in international relations.
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- Dragomir Bondžić, IZMEĐU AMBICIJA IILUZIJA. NUKLEARNA POLITIKA JUGOSLAVIJE 1945–1990
- Dragomir Bondžić, IZMEĐU AMBICIJA I ILUZIJA. NUKLEARNA POLITIKA JUGOSLAVIJE 1945–1990, Beograd, Institut za savremenu istoriju, Društvo istoričara Srbije „Stojan Novaković“, 2016, 460.
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- Drugi jugoslovensko-sovjetski sukob 1958. i koncept aktivne miroljubive koegzistencije
- Ten years later, the same contents, typical for the sharp confrontation between Yugoslavia and the USSR in 1949, characterized the second Yugoslav-Soviet conflict, as this sudden deterioration of relations between Belgrade and Moscow in 1958 was often named in the West. However, this time, the conflicts were less intensive and less dangerous than the previous one but their essence and contents were mainly the same. The cause for the renewed discontinuation of cooperation between the states and parties of Yugoslavia and the USSR was Yugoslavia’s rejection to sign the Declarations of 12 communist parties at the gathering in Moscow held in November, 1957, and the adoption of the Program of the Union of the Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) at the Seventh Congress in Ljubljana in April, 1958. The main reason, however, of the conflict between Khrushchev and Tito appeared due to the total failure of the Soviet action to get Yugoslavia back to the group of socialist states and persuade the Yugoslavs to renounce the politics of avoiding firm alliance with any of the two opposing blocks. All the Khrushchev’s illusions of the Yugoslavia’s return to the socialist circle definitely dispersed when the Yugoslav communists, instead of signing the declaration that had the character of the constitutive act of the new Cominform, adopted the Program of SKJ, i.e. the document of completely different content, with stress on communist parties’ independent choice of their path to socialism.
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- Dve knjige iz istorije rada
- Review of two books on history of work.
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- EKONOMSKA SARADNJA ZEMALJA MALE ANTANTE U PERIODU 1934 - 1938
- Автор данного научного труда задался целью провести анализ последнего периода экономических взаимоотношений стран Малой Антанты в промежутке 1934 - 1938 годов, когда ими был образован особый экономический орган - Экономический Совет Малой Антанты. Перед этим Советом стояла задача поддерживать и максимально развивать сотрудничество стран Малой Антанты. Соответствующий раздел истории Малой Антанты до сих пор только частично объянен. Цельо автора данного научного труда было представление цельной картины, при чем он сделал упор преимущественно на тщательное изучение чехословацких архивов. При оценке результатов экономического сотрудничества в рамках Малой Антанты в период 1934 - 1938 годов навязывается констатация о том, что это сотрудничество нисколько не соответствовало большим надеждам и прогнозам, высказанным в связи с образованием Экономического Совета Малой Антанты, назначением которого должно было быть способствование дальнейшему положительному развитию взаимоотношений странучастников. Эти далекоидущие прогнозы являлись, в первую очередь, последствием политики, вытекавшей из конкретного положения в 1933 году. Но, несмотря на это, Экономический Совет осуществил результаты, которые не следует оставить без внимания. Спад торговых отношений между ЧСР и ее партнеров в Малой Антанте был, правда, значительным в период кризиса, но, все-же, его масштабы не были катастрофическими, каковыми оказались отношения между ЧСР и остальными странами средней и юговосточной Европы. Несмотря на сопротивление аграрных кругов, чехословацким правителям удалось провести преференциалы на взоз сельскохозяйственных продуктов из стран Малой Антанты. И ассортимент продуктов, ввозимых в ЧСР из этих стран, с успехом был пополнен промышленным сырьем. Поставка вооружения являлась прочной составной частью экономических отношений и, фактически, их посредством осуществлялась и программа унификации и стандартизации в Малой Антанте. Не следовало бы оставить без внимания и остальные области, в которых Экономический Совет старался осуществить более теское сотрудничество между странами Малой Антанты Автор не упускает из виду и тот факт, что взаимоотношения стран Малой Антанты, невзирая на все это, по существу остались на двухстороннем уровне. Экономический Совет не стал многосторонним органом, а только трибуной для двухсторонних переговоров. Чехословацкой Республике, кроме того, не удалось отстоять свои позиции на рынках ее партнеров. Она не воспрепятствовала фактическому господству нацистской Германии на рынках Румынии и Югославии и не предотвратила германско-итальянскую блокаду путей к среднеевропейскому экономическому сообществу, которое бы, по политическим замыслам ЧСР, должно было стать препятствием в деле возрастания мощи нацистской Германии. Эта задача превышала силы Чехословакии. Не следует также упускать из виду и то, что уже при образовании Экономического Совета Малой Антанты центр тяжести экономических интересов отдельных участнилов Малой Антанты. Соответствующий раздел истории Малой Антанты центр тяжести их политических интересов. Не легко было отбросить дивергентные интересы, навязанные конкретными историческими условиями, определявшими политику каждой страны в международных отношениях, с одной стороны, и интересами правящих кругов, с другой стороны. Экономический национализм являлся органическим звеном капиталистической системы в этих странах и представлял собою непреодолимое препятствие на пути к какому-либо более тесному политическому и экономическому сотрудничеству, превышающему обычные межгосударственные контакты.
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- EKONOMSKI INTERESI SAD U JUGOSLAVIJI IZMEĐU DVA SVETSKA RATA
- The author suggests that post WWII US-Yugoslav relations had at least some of their roots in US-Yugoslav interwar economic relations. Unfortunately, these interwar economic contacts have, until now, received almost no attention by either American or Yugoslav scholars. From a purely interwar perspective, the author sees US-Yugoslav economic contacts as a case study in American activities in what Americans perceived as an economically marginal nation. In the years between the wars Eastern Europe in general and Yugoslavia in specific took a back seat to other parts of the world in terms both of American dollars and of American concern. At the time of its creation, Yugoslavia was not unknown to Americans and American businesses, and it needed foreign commerce and capital for reconstruction and development. Both countries expected a closes post-war relationship but those expectations never fully materialized. Initially at least (1919 - 1921) this was the result of a combination of factors ranging from post-war depression in America through negative press coverage of developments in the Balkans to inflation and trade controls in Yugoslavia. In the main, between 1919 and 1926, the United States government was unable or unwilling to promote economic contacts. When the war ended it stopped lending money itself and it discouraged private American banking institutions from lending money to governments which had not funded their war debts to the United States. The Commerce Department’s skepticism about Yugoslavia’s economic stability discouraged trade and investments. In the late 1920s and early 1930s, the United States government actively encouraged American trade with Yugoslavia but American trade policies made it difficult for Yugoslavia to sell to America. Yugoslavia’s chronic dollar shortage led, in the mid to late 1930s, to Yugoslav trade restrictions against American goods. Nevertheless, contacts did develop. In 1922 and then again in 1927 American banking houses floated major dollar loans to the Yugoslav government. American bankers and investors also loaned Yugoslav municipalities developmental moneys during the 1920s. The world wide economic crisis in the early 1930s led to Yugoslavia’s inability to service its foreign currency debts and brought an end to further American loans. Demands that these pre-war debts be paid would affect post WWII US-Yugoslav relations. In the late 1920s and early 1930s American businesses began increasingly to invest directly in Yugoslavia. Standard Oil of New York built a major refinery and controlled 50% of Yugoslavia’s petroleum supply and distribution. International Telephone and Telegraph and American-Yugoslav Electric Company, both subsidiaries of huge American corporations, invested in or owned facilities in Yugoslavia. The same is true of several other American companies. They were all hurt, in the mid to late 1930s, by Yugoslavia’s imposition of currency controls which made it difficult to impossible to convert dinar profits into exportable dollars. A slow but steady increase in American exports to Yugoslavia during the early to mid 1930s was halted, after about 1935, by Yugoslavia’s imposition of import restrictions on countries with which it did not have clearing arrangements - i.e. it decreased purchases which needed to be paid for in dollar currency. Extensive negotiating between the American and Yugoslav governments was not able to resolve this continuing dollar currency related impediment to bi-lateral economic contacts. German suppliers came more and more to replace American. The author suggests, in conclusion, that American economic involvements in Yugoslavia occurred, that they were more important for Yugoslavia than for the United States, and that they carried little if any contemporary political overtone. American business interests were limited by distance, unfamiliarity with the region, and by Yugoslavia’s marginal importance to America’s economic expansion. Motivated primarily by a desire to preserve its dollar currency reserve, the Yugoslav government was, for its part, willing and able to limit America’s economic penetration of Yugoslavia. Neither the American nor the Yugoslav governments were willing to make any special accommodation to the economic needs and/or practices of the other country in order to encourage greater contact.
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- EKSTREMNA EMIGRACIJA U SR NEMAČKOJ I JUGOSLAVIJA
- Normalization of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Federal Republic of Germany was followed with the desire to settle all bilateral issues. Still, the activity of Yugoslav emigration in the Federal Republic of Germany was burdening Yugoslav-German relations well into 1990s. The terrorist activity of Yugoslav emigration was abundant only at the territory of the Federal Republic. After the creation of Great Coalition, German government showed signs of political will to prevent this terrorist activity. Willy Brandt’s coming to power in FRG was characterized with the attempts to eliminate terrorist activity of Croatian emigration. Visit of German Minister of Interior to Yugoslavia and the conclusion of extradition treaty showed the actual intention to solve this matter permanently. Still, the severed regime of German authorities towards political organization of foreigners did not prevent the terrorist activity. Croatian emigration continued organizing the attacks, mainly directed against Yugoslav diplomats. At the same time, emigration was still active among Yugoslav workers. It is hard to assess the actual impact of these organizations on Yugoslav workers in the light of the limited archival material. Undoubtedly, Croatian diaspora had a significant role in happenings in the former Yugoslavia during 1990s.