Istorija 20. veka

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Journal Istorija 20.veka (History of the 20th Century) is continually published biannually from 1983. Journal considers previously unpublished manuscripts of articles and scholarly contributions whose object is contemporary history of Serbia, former Yugoslavia and the Balkans in European and global context. Articles are expected to be interdisciplinary, based on original archival researches. Journal publishes articles that critically investigate social, cultural, economic and intellectual developments of 20th century. All received manuscripts are a subject to a double-blind external peer review process. In order to be accepted the manuscripts need to be deemed publishable by the editorial board and two anonymous reviewers. Articles are published in Serbian and English, and in other languages should the need arise.
Journal is included in SCOPUS, ERIH PLUS index (European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences), Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL) and Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). According to the categorization of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, since 2015 it carries the category “National Journal of International Importance (M24)”. History of the 20th Century is an Open Access Journal.
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ISSN 0352-3160
eISSN 2560-3647
doi 10.29362/ist20veka


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ELEMENTI SAMOUPRAVE RUSKIH CIVILNIH IZBEGLICA U KRALJEVINI SHS 1920-1924.
ELEMENTI SAMOUPRAVE RUSKIH CIVILNIH IZBEGLICA U KRALJEVINI SHS 1920-1924.
Russian refugees differed from other emigrants who came to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) in terms of both structure (a considerable number of them were army personnel) and in the manner in which they arrived to the host country (the majority came in organized groups). The greatest difference, however, lay in the fact that, in the initial phase of their arrival, Russian refugees in the Kingdom of SHS had at their disposal, besides the full fledged diplomatic representation of the Russian Mission in Belgrade, another Russian government institution, Управление Главноуполномоченнаго по устройству русскихль беженцевль вль Юго-Славии (Office of the High Commissioner for the Organization of Russian Refugees in Yugoslavia). This organization cooperated with the government authorities of the Kingdom of SHS, accepted by them as some sort of internal administrative organ of the Russian refugees. The main tasks of the Office of the High Commissioner were to organize and follow up the general conditions under which the refugees arrived and were received, finding accommodation for the newcomers in the colonies and distributing the financial aid granted by the Kingdom of SHS. The Office had a deciding influence on the internal organization and life of the refugees in colonies throughout the country, and played an important part in the organization and work of arbitration tribunals and courts of honor. The details of Russian refugees’ self-government and their relations with the host country have not been thoroughly examined yet, primarily because the relevant and very rich archival sources are not in Yugoslavia (but in the US) but also because in some cases the exact location of the archives was not known (for instance, the State Committee Archive of the Kingdom of SHS - Yugoslavia for Aid to Russian Refugees was located in Russia). A closer study of these sources will undoubtedly reveal many new facts and aspects of Russian refugees’ self-government in Yugoslavia.
ETNIČKA SLIKA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE PRE I POSLE DEJTONA
ETNIČKA SLIKA BOSNE I HERCEGOVINE PRE I POSLE DEJTONA
This work is a study of the centuries-long demographic regression of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian state which existed prior to Turkish conquests, stretched between the river Una and the Novi Grad sea in the west, and the river Drina in the east. The period following Turkish penetration of the Balkans, the years under Austro-Hungarian occupation and the period of the common Yugoslav state are given particular attention. The demographic regression of the Serbs was caused by the abduction of children as a form of tribute, by conversion to Islam and Catholicism and by the Croatisation of the Serbian population. In 1847 the population was 51.13% Serb, 13.92% Croat and 34.95% Muslim. Territorially, Serbs were in the majority in 24 districts (»nahije«) (54,54%), Croats in 13 (29,54%) and Muslims in 7 (15.90%). The Austro-Hungarian occupation of this region caused by 1910 the departure of 250.000 Serbs and tens of thousands of Muslims, and the arrival of tens of thousands of Catholics - Croats. That year Serbs were the most numerous ethnic group in 27 districts (»srez«) (49,09%), Muslims in 16 (28,57%) and Croats in 12 (21,43%). The author sees a connection between these figures and the views expressed at the Dayton conference that Republika Srpska should receive 49% of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the course of the First World War, out of a total of 522.000 lives lost 45% were Serbs, 30% Muslims and 23% Croats. The Second World War also caused the greatest losses to the Serbs, out of 700.000 casualties 57% were Serbs, 15.7% Muslims and 26.5% Croats. During the wars both Austria-Hungary and Germany recruited large numbers of Croats and Muslims into Austro-Hungarian and Ustasa military units which executed mass genocide of Serbs. On the other side were Cetnik units which carried out the genocide of Muslims and Croats. This made the formation of a multi-cultured environment in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-war period extremely difficult. Throughout this period the division of power between Croats and Muslims is evident, accompanied by various forms of repression against the Serbs. Partly as a result of this situation and partly for economic reasons about 600.000 Serbs left Bosnia an Herzegovina by 1991, dropping to 31,4% of the population. The Muslim population inhabiting this territory became homogeneous after they acquired national status. There had been no demographic growth among the Serbs from 1961 to 1991. The civil war drove Muslims and Croats from Serbian territories and Serbs from territories held by the Muslim-Croat federation. The exchange of refugees is slowed down and hampered by the extreme hatred and mutual distrust of the sides involved. The author predicts a stable situation in the future, in which the Muslim-Croat federation will have about 2.300.000 inhabitants (65% Muslim, 26% Croat, 6.5% Serb and 1.5% other), while Republika Srpska will have a population of 1.850.000 inhabitants (85% Serb, 5.5% Croat, 5.5% Muslim and 4% other). The settlement in Republika Srpska of a large number of Serb refugees from Croatia is anticipated by the author. Consequently, the territory will be divided in a proportion of 51:49 and the population in a proportion of 55.4%:44.6%. The implementation of the Dayton agreement will mark an end to a period of the formation of nation states on the territory of the former SFRY with a distinct decrease of Serbian ethnic territory. Serbian land will spread over 127.305 sqkm (FRY and Republika Srpska), or 49.84% of the territory of the former SFRY (although Serbian ethnic territory previously occupied 65-70% of this territory), the territory of the Muslim-Croat federation will occupy 82.385 sqkm (32,25%), Slovenia 19.992 sqkm (7.83%) and Macedonia 25.713 sqkm (10.06%).
EVOLUCIJA SOVJETSKIH I AMERIČKIH STAVOVA PREMA POLITICI I POKRETU NESVRSTANOSTI
EVOLUCIJA SOVJETSKIH I AMERIČKIH STAVOVA PREMA POLITICI I POKRETU NESVRSTANOSTI
Attitudes of the great powers toward the policy and non-alignment movement were evolving side by side with the process of changing of their foreign strategy, reflecting gradually real relations in international community. In the period of the first years of affirmation of non-alignment policy, the great powers estimated and valued foreign orientation of newly liberated countries with obvious dis-contempt, qualifying the conception of non-binding for any bloc as a kind of neutrality and opportunism. However, with changings in international relations and strengthening of non-alignment, the attitude of the great powers toward this policy has changed as they, irrespective of their own standpoints an interests, had sooner or later to accept non-alignment as present and organized power that must be take count of seriously in creation their global foreign-relations strategy. In Stalin’s period, Soviet science and policy ignored appearance of non-alignment in accordance with stalinist sectarian slogan. Who is not with us, he is against us”, which was, of course, the expression of dis-contempt and suspicion toward that policy. After Stalin’s death, in mid-fifties. Soviet Union started to accept the policy of non-binding for blocs as a positive position in international relations, qualifying it as a significant contribution to peace in the world. But, although the non-aligned policy was understood only as a „reserve” or „younger partner” of socialist forces and not as an independent factor of international relations. In mid-seventies a principal and radical turnover appeared in Soviet attitude toward non-alignment. Since that time Soviet science and practical policy show an intensified interest for non-alignment, which is characterised as a very significant contribution to peace and an independent and active factor of international relations. However, from the very beginning of non-alignment, till now, Soviet Union tried to fit it into the frame of its own international strategy and to turn it into the direction which would be most suitable to real Soviet foreign interests. The approach of USA to the non-alignment policy in the first years of cold war was extremely negative and hostile. Understood as a policy directly meant against interests of West, the non-alignment was characterized as an amoral and shortsighted concepcy. Further evolution of American approach of non-alignment, followed a line of tacit approval of non-alignment policy, but with further conflict with non-alignment countries, until, at the end of seventies, in the time of Carter’s government, entered the phase of public recognition and respect, with an accent on necessity of collaboration with non-aligned countries. But, in eighties, USA show tendency for gradual exclusion of non-alignment movement from international scene by neutralizing and passivizing it, which evidently represents a serious step backward in previous evolution of American approach to non-alignment.
Ekonomija i termodinamika
Ekonomija i termodinamika
Atricle about the use of the mathematical phenonemology in the economic analyses in Serbia.
Ekonomska saradnja Jugoslavije i SAD u vreme drugog jugoslovensko-sovjetskog sukoba (1958–1959)
Ekonomska saradnja Jugoslavije i SAD u vreme drugog jugoslovensko-sovjetskog sukoba (1958–1959)
Even though the Yugoslav management during the 1950-s, in the time of normalization of relations with the USSR, was interested in keeping the positive trend of political and economic relations with the United States, it still did not succeed in this attempt completely. The problem was the fact that every indication of normalization of relation between Belgrade and the socialist faction in the West was extremely negatively accepted and interpreted as the return of Yugoslavia to the group of the ideologically similar countries. Therefore, Yugoslavia’s nearing the USSR resulted in the accelerated cooling of relations with the USA and narrowing the sphere of economic cooperation of the two countries. The situation became even more complicated, as far as Yugoslavia was concerned, in the spring of 1958, at the time when willingness of the Soviet and Yugoslav management for close relations had started melting, leading to the new Yugoslav-Soviet conflict. Tito and his associates again confronted the danger to bring the country in the international isolation and deprive it of foreign credits and trade arrangements that were of great necessity for them. Similarly as in the time of the conflict between Yugoslavia and the countries of Cominform in 1948, the Yugoslav government had to ask the moguls from Washington, whom they ideologically disliked, for help. At first sight, it looked absurd but this time too, the survival of the Yugoslav socialist regime and realization of its international strategy depended on their cooperation. American government’s readiness to respond positively to Yugoslavia’s demands was conditioned by the same reasons as in the time of the severe conflict between Tito and Stalin. According to the American President, Eisenhower, and the Secretary General, Dulles, helping Yugoslavia represented helping to centrifugal forces in the communist movement, inevitably leading to the weakening of its inner cohesion. Considering that in the American political circles this view prevailed over the attitude advocated by the opponents of the support to „communist Yugoslavia“, the USA again became the important prop of Tito’s regime and its key economic partner. In the relations of Yugoslavia and the USA, the old rule was still topical: Yugoslavia’s nearing the USSR always resulted in cooling the relations with the USA as much as deteriorating the relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR inevitably led to improving the relations with this Western force.
Ekstradicija ratnih zločinaca
Ekstradicija ratnih zločinaca
The question of sanctioning war crimes was set in during the military operations of the World War II. The principal agreements had been reached at the Moscow and Teheran Conference, and conferences at Yalta and Potsdam. The way in which these agreements became reality partially can be seen through the documents of the State/Lands’ Commissions for the determination of crimes of occupiers and their collaborators, which have been established as one of the investigative bodies of the new authorities in Yugoslavia after the war. Thesedocuments testify to the tasks of the Commission, specifically in this article author elaborates one of the most important executive tasks relating the issue of extradition of war criminals and its implementation. The overall performance of Commissions was significantly affected by a shortage of personnel and professional staff, as well as a lack of material resources. Author also emphasizes uneven benchmarks regarding the determination of the guilt, which was often accompanied with a political subjectivity. This iscorroborated by the fact that at the time the legal system was just emerging and the question of criminal law norms was only partially resolved. Moreover, the overall international relations were not encouraging, and the Western allies were quite skeptical towards “quick justice rush“, without dropping out of sight of their global, geostrategic interests and plans.
Elementi REPRESIVNE prakse U Kraljevini SHS 1918–1929
Elementi REPRESIVNE prakse U Kraljevini SHS 1918–1929
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes failed to combine partial rationalities of economical and technical efficiency and the security measures with the societal sensibility, which resulted in psychophysical consequences of the resistance to the state. It happened due to the fear that the acknowledgement of the societal sensibility could negate the relative importance of the security and its need in practice. The attempt of the government to diminish this pattern on a local level was in contradiction with the practice of distortion of legal system, which was frequently supported from the center of state and political power. Local authorities from time to time used repressive methods even one against the other in the cases of the lack of trust and cooperation. Local authorities risked their reputation in an attempt to maintain their superior authority. For the people repression was embodied in persons in power, ranging from the local administrator or municipality leader to state ministers and the ruler. The government resembled a patriarchal community that was even to be warned about the consequences of the acts improper in the rural context. Consequently, all of the social strata and groups had their own perception of repression, which led to the lack of accordance on the general view on the purpose of repressive measures and the ways of their implementation.
Elitno i popularno u jugoslovenskoj filmskoj kulturi 1945-1965.
Elitno i popularno u jugoslovenskoj filmskoj kulturi 1945-1965.
The aim of this article is to try to apply the theory of culture of the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, which is based on the distinction between the elitist and the popular, on the domain of the Yugoslav film culture in the period between 1945–1965. Using Bourdieu’s hypothesis that conflicting artistic tastes reflect the class antagonism in the capitalist society we tried to show how aesthetic distinctions function in the case of the film culture of socialist Yugoslavia. The communist project of a classless society proved to be incapable of producing a society devoid of relations of domination and subordination. Socialist realism tried to mask the gap between the majority of population and the party bureaucracy by means of abolishing the division between the elite and the popular culture and by creating a uniform culture for the entire population. The entire social field was thus totalised by one art form. The project of Yugoslav selfmanagement socialism, conditioned by the Cold War situation between the East and the West, failed to develop a distinct cultural model. The project of a classless, self-governing society was hiding the gap between the new governing elite and the rest of the population, the gap that was evident in the existence of the two distinct cultures: the elite culture of socialist aestheticism and the popular culture of the rest of the population. In order to cover this social split the rulling communist party would often start the socalled anti-bureaucratic reforms, changing the cultural paradigms in order to maintain the illusion that the process of permanent self-governing revolution and withering away of the state is in progress. Occasional censorship of both elite and the popular film was to maintain the illusion that Yugoslav society and its culture were on the tracks of their own autochtonous third way road of socialism with a human face. In fact the country was more and more economically and culturally dependent of the Western countries, and the governing elite unwilling to cede power to the ’working people’.
Erik Hobsbaum
Erik Hobsbaum
Interview with Eric Hobsbawm
Evolucija sovjetskih gledišta prema politici nesvrstanosti
Evolucija sovjetskih gledišta prema politici nesvrstanosti
During the period of the Cold War in relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, three phases of political standpoints on non-aligned policy and movement could be identified. First phase was during the era of Stalinism, when the non-bloc attitude of the first liberated states in the Third World was totally ignored in the Moscow. After the changes during the Khrushchev era this attitude was slowly corrected. It was perceived as the useful contribution of the Third World countries in the clash with the Western policies and generally as contribution to the world peace. But the Yugoslav political orientation to the non-aligned movement at the same period was criticized as abandoning of the fundamental standpoints of the Marxism and betrayal of the socialism. Later, during 1970-ties and the enlargement of the Non-aligned movement, which led to its importance in the international relations, the official Moscow again changed its attitudes to- wards non-aligned movement and Yugoslavia too. Although this standpoint was now positive, it was obvious that Soviet Union have the intention to connect the Movement and Yugoslavia much more with the socialistic bloc, and to confront it with the West.
FABRIKA I GRAD
FABRIKA I GRAD
Kragujevac was an industrial town from the earliest period of the modern history of Serbia. Its military indusrial complex was situated in the close proximity of the downtown area. The development of industry was given its greatest impetus in the 1960s with the establishment of the automobile industry and the erection of the automobile factory in 1962. In the mid 1970s the „Crvena zastava“ factory contributed by 80% to the economy of Kragujevac and its surroundings. The large investments in the automobile industry in the 1960s and 1970s triggered the speedy development of the town and of the building activities on such a scale that urban planning simply could not keep pace with spontaneous growth of the town dwelling area. The result was illegal building, one of the most characteristic and durable phenomena of the Yugoslav industrialization and modernization. The dwelling areas in the town were spreading fast from 1953 to 1973 (the period of the fastest growth of car industry), by cc.150 ha per annum. Multy-storey residential buildings have changed the traditional townscape. However, they could not be erected soon enough to provide accommodation for a neverending influx of population. The fast growing car industry led to another important feature of the development of Kragujevac – the creation of large urban agglomeration, by merging surrounding villages with the town. Since the 1960s the industry and dwelling zones were predominant in Kragujevac, in comparison with communal municipal infrastructure, which was seriously lagging behind (especially the water supply system and the road network). Kragujevac and its industry (like the Yugoslav economy as a whole) have reached the peak of their development in the 1970s. After the global oil crisis in 1979 the whole process of Yugoslav industrialization was brought to a halt, and the car industry in Kragujevac, as well as the town itself entered the phase of stagnation. However, regardless of the decline of car industry, the influx of population did not stop, but continued in a different form. Instead of workers in search of jobs, the refugees from Bosnia and Croatia, and the internally displaced persons from Kosovo kept coming to the Kragujevac during the 1990s wars in ex Yugoslavia.

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