Istorija 20. veka

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Journal Istorija 20.veka (History of the 20th Century) is continually published biannually from 1983. Journal considers previously unpublished manuscripts of articles and scholarly contributions whose object is contemporary history of Serbia, former Yugoslavia and the Balkans in European and global context. Articles are expected to be interdisciplinary, based on original archival researches. Journal publishes articles that critically investigate social, cultural, economic and intellectual developments of 20th century. All received manuscripts are a subject to a double-blind external peer review process. In order to be accepted the manuscripts need to be deemed publishable by the editorial board and two anonymous reviewers. Articles are published in Serbian and English, and in other languages should the need arise.
Journal is included in SCOPUS, ERIH PLUS index (European Reference Index for the Humanities and Social Sciences), Central and Eastern European Online Library (CEEOL) and Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). According to the categorization of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, since 2015 it carries the category “National Journal of International Importance (M24)”. History of the 20th Century is an Open Access Journal.
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ISSN 0352-3160
eISSN 2560-3647
doi 10.29362/ist20veka


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BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA U RASPRAVAMA О DRŽAVNOM UREĐENJU KRALJEVINE (SHS) JUGOSLAVIJE 1918 - 1941. GODINE
BOSNA I HERCEGOVINA U RASPRAVAMA О DRŽAVNOM UREĐENJU KRALJEVINE (SHS) JUGOSLAVIJE 1918 - 1941. GODINE
According to many contemporaries and latter-day historians, the most serious inner problem facing the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the question of state reform. The issue of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a particularly controversial topic in these debates. The position of this province was directly subject to an agreement between the Serbs and Croatians, since the political inclinations of the Bosnian-Herzegovian Muslims could not have greater impact in the national status-quo of the first Yugoslav state. In their demands for a reform based on national principles and the creation of federal units, the Croatian political representatives offered several suggestions concerning Bosnia and Herzegovina. One of their proposals was that a greater part of the province should be given an autonomous or equal status in regard to the other federal units. The second suggestion was to divide Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Serbian and Croatian units and according to the third, founded on the idea of a dual Yugoslav state, the border would be on the Drina, while Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole would become a part of the Croatian region. The majority of the Serbian political parties were against these solutions. Fearing a demarcation between the Serbs and the Croatians, the Democratic party proposed that Bosnia and Herzegovina with south Dalmatia become a fourth unit-the Serbian Croatian and Slovenian units being the other three. A part of the Serbian independent intellectuals supported this proposal. However, the Democrats themselves abandoned this proposal when Banovina Hrvatska was formed since it included 13 Bosnian-Herzegovian districts. From that time all Serbian political parties and organizations defended the view that Bosnia and Herzegovina was a Serbian province inhabited, towards the end of 1939, according to the Ministry Council statistics, by 1.226.991 (44.6%) orthodox Serbs, 858.140 (31.2%) Muslims, 595.974 (21.7%) catholic Croatians, 4.358 (0.1%) catholic Slovenians and 63.720 (2.3%) inhabitants of other nationalities and adherents of other religions. Contrarily, Croatian politicians demanded a further division of Bosnia and Herzegovina or the autonomy of the remaining part of this province. In this way the Croatians gave the impression of supporting the claims to independence of the Bosnian-Herzegovian Muslims.
BRITANSKA BALKANSKA POLITIKA I JUGOSLOVENSKO - BUGARSKI PREGOVORI - NOVEMBAR 1944. - MART 1945.
BRITANSKA BALKANSKA POLITIKA I JUGOSLOVENSKO - BUGARSKI PREGOVORI - NOVEMBAR 1944. - MART 1945.
During the Second World War some of the old Alliance’s political plans were activated, but also some new concepts were conceived for establishment of the Balkan Federation or South-Slov Federation. These ideas were also supported among the Anti-Fashistic Forces, first of all Yugoslav and Bulgarian. Motives that inspired the Great Powers to bring this subject forward were various, as well as their political and ideological reasons, but their ultimate object was the same: to set out the preliminary actions for consolidating their position at this strategically important area. In this article, based on the British diplomatic materials concerned with the period from November 1944 until March 1945, the problem is regarded as a part of the diplomatic and political game. The Soviet Union supported these plans for Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to make a contract for alliance and collaboration, and helped the negotiations to take place as well. In the British Diplomatic Services this was regarded as the first step towards creating the „exclusive” South-Slov Federative State. This was to give the Soviet Union an opportunity for further expansion to the South - towards Greece, the last British South-Eastern strong point. An action that was taken to prevent the creation of either Alliance or Federation of Yugoslavia and Bulgaria lasted for several months continually, from the end of 1944 until the beginning of 1945 and only brought partial results: the negotiations were temporarily ceased, before all because the Soviet Union wanted to avoid widening of the gap in relations between the East and the West Alliance on the eve of the Peace Conference. But, still, this attempt in no way succeeded in preventing the action of bringing Yugoslavia and Bulgaria closer together. This article also includes inquiries into various kinds of political pres sure on Moscow, Belgrade and Sophia Diplomatic Services during the Yugoslav - Bulgarian affair. USA, as a British alliance, also made its appearance in this political event, although ostensibly not very interested in British „Balkan concerns”. Questions concerning this problem, arguments of the Alliances, as well as the way they led this diplomatic game clearly presented severance of the relations among the Great Powers. Also, their political orientations and methods were obvious, especially towards „small countries” which were to remain only an object of the policy of the Great Ones.
BRITANSKI ISTORIČARI I JADRANSKO PITANJE U TOKU 1914 - 1915. GODINE
BRITANSKI ISTORIČARI I JADRANSKO PITANJE U TOKU 1914 - 1915. GODINE
After the outbreak of the First World War, Italy proclaimed its neutrality, on august 3th 1914. The Italian government however, from the very beginning tried to take advantage of the new situation, emphasizing the question of «unredeemed territories«. The Italian government also considered the possibility of attacking the Habsburg Monarchy, but could not easily take that dangerous course. The Entente powers, considering that Italian intervention was of utmost importance, opened the negotiations with the Italian government, in august 1914, trying to induce it to enter the War. The negotiations were led with unequal success. Considering the political and military impact of Italy, the Entente powers considered that concessions should be made to that country, on the Eastern Adriatic coast. The advantage of bringing Italy to the side of the Entente was fully acknowledged even by the group of scientific and public workers gathered around Henry Wickham Steed Robert William Seton-Waitsom, and Arthur Evans, although! this group previously developed considerable activity in favor of unification of Yugoslav peoples. Although the members of the group were particularly active during the negotiations between the Entente powers and Italy they could do little for the cause of Serbia and Yugoslavia. The aid-memoirs, letters and reports that some of them sent to the Foreign Office during the winter and spring 1914 - 1915, were not totally useless, as some authoritative British circles were better acquainted with the subject than before the outbreak of the War. Thanks to their help, Edward Grey, and Other British politicians, did for the Serbian and Yugoslav cause, what was »possible« (according to their views), but also what was in the interest of Great Britain. The activity of the group, contributed to acquaint not only politicians, 'but the British people as well, with the Adriatic question.
BRITANSKI ISTORIČARI I MAKEDONSKO PITANJE (1914 - 1915)
BRITANSKI ISTORIČARI I MAKEDONSKO PITANJE (1914 - 1915)
The article deals with the attitude of several British historians towards the question of Macedonia, during 1914 and 1915. At the beginning of World War I, nationality and right to self determination were proclaimed as leading political principles, by the Entente. In 1914 and 1915, however, the foreign policy of Great Britain had still no definite opinion about the future of South-Eastern Europe. Some of its most important representatives still considered Austria -Hungary as a main guarantee of status-quo in Europe, and did not approve its desintegration. But there were also quite different views, i. e. that the falling apart of Austria-Hungary, and the formation of national States in South-Eastern Europe, must follow the victory in the war. The champions of this idea, in Great Britain were several British intellectuals, mainly historians, among others: Henry Wickham Steed, Robert William Seton-Watson, Sir Arthur Evans, Sir Charles William Chadwick Oman, George Macaulay Trevelyan, Harold William Vazeille Temperley and Ronald Burrows. Their activity was specially noticeable in 1914 and 1915, when British foreign policy tried to win over neutral Bulgaria to the side of the Entente. As concerning Bulgarian demands of some important parts of Serbian national territory in Macedonia, as compensation for their joining the Entente, they were not unanimous: some of them were not particularly interested by that question, but still considered that Macedonia must be a part of the future Southern Slav State, but the others adopted the bugarophil opinion that the inhabitants of Macedonia were of Bulgarian origin. But, when Bulgaria joined the Central Powers in autumn 1915, they became champions of Serbian rights over Macedonia, criticizing the official British policy, which, according to them caused the tragedy of Serbia in 1915.
BUGARSKA U PRIPREMAMA ZA OKUPACIJU JUGOSLAVIJE - PRILOG IZUČAVANJU »VELIKOBUGARSKE IDEJE« 1939. - 1941.
BUGARSKA U PRIPREMAMA ZA OKUPACIJU JUGOSLAVIJE - PRILOG IZUČAVANJU »VELIKOBUGARSKE IDEJE« 1939. - 1941.
Emperor Boris III and his government did not seen Germany’s penetration into Bulgaria as a loss of sovereignty and independence, although the people of the country regarded it as precisely that. A series of circumstances, objective (economic dependence, full 'dependence on Germany for the acquisition of arms, Germany’s great influence on Bulgarian armed forces through the industry, instructors and counselors) and subjective (the ideological affinity of the two regimes, the Germanophile inclinations of the Bulgarian bourgeoisie, anti-Communism as the official doctrine in both countries and shared revisionist tendencies), encouraged the strengthening of the military and political position of Hitler’s Germany in Bulgaria. The decidedly pro-germanic orientation of the Bulgarian monarcho-fascist rulers ensured the support of other countries of the Axis to this regime which, in conditions of domestic hostility, gave the ruling class valuable aid in preserving power. Emperor Boris III and the Bulgarian government, led by practical reasons and strategic interests on the Balkans, which were defined in the »Great-Bulgarian Program«, made theoretical and practical preparations from 1939 to 1941 for the events which would take place between 1941 and 1944. The preparations were manifested in the creation of political and economic concepts, the strengthening of the pro-fascist ideology and the building of a strong military and police force backed by Germany. Furthermore, the events of this period clearly showed that the success of the occupation would also depend on the processes of disintegration and inter-ethnic problems existent in Yugoslavia. Bulgaria became Germany’s most trusted ally on the Balkans. Having received Hitler’s permission on 18 April 1941, Bulgaria began to put into effect the »Great-Bulgarian Program« with all its forces (military, police, political, legal, educational and church administration). In order to ensure the support of public opinion for this policy, the idea of »liberating old Bulgarian« territories and people and their »union with mother Bulgaria«was spread with the aid of powerful propaganda.
BUHARINOV SPOPAD S STALINOM
BUHARINOV SPOPAD S STALINOM
From his long research of the struggle between fractions of the Russian Communist Party (the Bolsheviks), the author singles out the attitude of Stalin towards the so-called „right” group, led by Buharin. During his earlier clash with the representatives of the „left” fraction (Trotski/Zinoviev), Stalin had actually relied on Buharin as one of the best Party ideologists, relenting temporarily to Buharin’s „rightist” orientation. In domestic affairs this meant carrying out the „New Economic Policy”, based to a great extent on market economy and on the doctrine of the feasibility of „socialism in a single country”, while in term s of foreign relations it meant supporting Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese „national” revolution. Stalin introduced changes to all this towards the end of 1927, following his conflict with the „left” opposition and the failure of the Chinese Revolution. The political axis of this turnabout was the altered position regarding the social-democratic parties, which were branded as being imperialist and fashist aliys. In domestic politics, the „New Economic Policy” was abandoned, along with the allience with the peasantry, which was only a prelude to forced collectivization and mass persecution of peasants. Since Buharin’s fraction was against these steps, Stalin declared it „rightist” and the biggest threat to the Party. Stalin began the conflict with Buharin's group even before and during the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (in the summer of 1928), although Buharin was the main spokesman for the program of the Comintern at the Congress, and had considerably conformed to Stalin's views about the termination of the stabilization period of capitalism and the dawning of a „new era of revolutions and wars”. Stalin, then, carried out the political liquidation of Buharin’s group at the plenary session of the Russion Communist Party in 1929.
Beogradska politička i vojna elita u svetlu nemačkih i britanskih izvora pred Drugi svetski rat
Beogradska politička i vojna elita u svetlu nemačkih i britanskih izvora pred Drugi svetski rat
German and British influences prevailed in the politics of Yugoslavia in the late 1930s. British influence gained foot because of the dominant role of United Kingdom in the League of Nations, as well as because of the close relationship Prince Paul Karadjordjevic, the Regent, kept with leading British politicians. On the other hand, German influence became dominant in Yugoslav economy and therefore, was felt also in the politics. There was a great difference between the interest that both Great Britain and Germany had in the Balkan affairs and the priorities of the Yugoslav foreign policy. Yugoslavia was more oriented towards western powers (Britain and France) than towards Germany, whereas Germany, on the other hand, was much more interested in the Balkans than United Kingdom. Both Germany and Great Britain used their political influence on Yugoslav elite in many different ways. Therefore, German and British documents are very important for the history of Yugoslavia in the 1930s, and even more so when history of foreign policy and defence is concerned. These documents are indispensable when speaking of the role of Prince Paul, the Regent, and Milan Stojadinovic, the Prime Minister, both men being the key figures of Yugoslav politics and very much influenced by Great Britain and Germany. Each international crises in the 1930s added to the anxiety and hostility that Belgrade intellectuals and politicians felt for Germany. The standing of Western democracies among them was very low, and even the British officials in Belgrade could not report differently to their superiors. Nevertheless, German officials in Belgrade reported that Yugoslav elite was truly inclined towards cooperation with Britain and France. Alltogether, British documents are much more accurate in describing the real disposition of Yugoslav elite circles, whereas the German documents show a certain tendency to overlook the „bad news“ and to put things in a more optimistic light. The Yugoslav military officials held the British army in a very high esteem, especially their naval and aircraft forces. Some Yugoslav army officers were educated in Great Britain.The Yugoslav aircraft was made after the model of British „Spitfire“ and „Hurricane“ planes. On the other hand, in the purchase of military equipment Yugoslav army was not motivated by political orientation, but by the prices and quality of the arms. The struggle between Britain and Germany for the Yugoslav market of arms and military equipment was primarily a political one, and the business reasons were not so important. The Third Reich penetrated Yugoslav market in arms and military equipment, as it did in every other way. The British did not succeed in counteracting it. German and British documents provide a very good insight in the real position of Yugoslavia on the eve of the WWII, and her inability to deal with German pressure and purchase the neccesary military equipment.
Beogradske pijace šezdesetih godina 20. veka
Beogradske pijace šezdesetih godina 20. veka
In the 1960s, Belgrade put great efforts into satisfying its growing city’s needs with food of industrial origin. In a condition such was that, a peasants’ market showed great vitality, surviving as one of the places of privacy and the only place where peasants were able to sell their products to buyers directly and legally. During two and a half of the post-war decades, markets passed a long road – from skepticism, through the ideas of cancellation, to acceptance and authorities’ efforts to organize their work by a number of regulations. Broadening the market network in the city infallibly followed the spatial and demographic broadening of the city. As a result, the number of Belgrade markets grew from about 15 at the beginning of the 1960s to more than 20 at the end of the 1970s. In spite of the great number of regulations on hygiene and order at markets, their work was characterized by lack of hygiene and weak respect of the authorities’ decisions. The most important city market was Kalenic market that covered 13,7% of market space in the city and where one fifth of the Belgrade markets turnover was made.
Bolnice u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji – „uskraćene“ ustanove kurativne struke. Primer opšte bolnice u Ljubljani
Bolnice u Kraljevini Jugoslaviji – „uskraćene“ ustanove kurativne struke. Primer opšte bolnice u Ljubljani
The article focuses on the overcrowding of the General State Hospital in Ljubljana during the period between the wars, although this hospital also faced other personnel and staffing problems. The spatial problem exceeded the limits of the bearable and was not only a Slovenian, but to a large extent an all Yugoslav problem. Criticisms regarding the poor financial, spatial, and staffing situation of hospitals were coming in from the banovinas (subdivisions of the state). The pressures on the central government to solve the problems were increasing. The state operated within its financial capabilities; especially during the period of the economic crisis, the Ministry of Social Policy and National Health could solve and regulate only the basic issues. The problem of hospitals was addressed more thoroughly by the Minister Dragiša Cvetković, who made concrete proposals for the drafting of a new act on hospitals. It seemed that things could slowly be put right, but the positive development was interrupted by the war. The spatial problem of the central Ljubljana hospital was not solved.
Bosna i Hercegovina u Vardaru - kalendaru Kola srpskih sestara
Bosna i Hercegovina u Vardaru - kalendaru Kola srpskih sestara
Humanitarian society of Kolo Srpskih Sestara, founded in Belgrade in 1903, directed its main goal towards helping the Serbian people living in the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1906, the society started printing its annual calendar, simbolically named Vardar. Its content was adjusted to their main mission, as well as the literary works and illustrations which were published. In 1908, with the position of Serbian people changing in Old Serbia and Macedonia, the emphasis was moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The positions of Serbs in these territories became the main subject of the calendar. Many letters were sent to the editorial office from Sarajevo, Banja Luka and other places. Every opportunity was used for a closer contact and exchange of information. This is why the members of the society of Kolo Srpskih Sestara sent their managing member and founder Delfa Ivanić to the funeral of famous Adelina Irbi in Sarajevo in 1911. She travelled along with Živojin Dačić, secretary of organization Narodna odbrana (National Defense), so they used their visit to Sarajevo and Banja Luka for other activities, naturally under the watchful eye of the Austro-Hungarian authorities. The editorial staff of Vardar kept tight connections with Nikola Kašiković, editor of Bosanska Vila, as well as with the members of the Humanitarian Collectives of Serbian Women in Sarajevo and Banja Luka.
Bugarska politička emigracija u kraljevini SHS
Bugarska politička emigracija u kraljevini SHS
The topic on the article is Bulgarian political emigration in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS). They were followers of Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Communist Party. Emigration was formed after a coup in Bulgaria on the 9 th June 1923 (agrarian emigrants) and a unsuccessful communist revolution on September of the same year (Communist emigrants). They become political refugees in the Kingdom of SHS, since it has been an opponent to the new Bulgarian government. The leaders of the agrarian emigration (Rayko Daskalov, Kosta Todorov, Alexander Obov) immediately formed a political organization. The organization’s most important center was Belgrade runned by the Kosta Todorov. The agrarian emigrants in the Kingdom of SHS created the secret Revolutionary committee. The aim of this committee was to overthrow Bulgarian government, and therefore they have entered into an alliance with the Communists. They even received weapons and other aid from the government of the Kingdom of SHS. Later, they made several attacks on the territory of Bulgaria, operating from the territory of the Kingdom of SHS. Their organization disintegrated in the spring of the 1925 following the disputes among the agrarian emigration leaders. After the 1925, the Bulgarian emigration started to be a problem in relationship between the Kingdom of SHS and Bulgaria, and follwoing it lost its role in foreign policy of the Kingdom of SHS.

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