Vojnoistorijski glasnik

: ОСНИВАЊЕ И РАД КОНТРАОБАВЕШТАЈНЕ СЛУЖБЕ У ЈУГОСЛОВЕНСКИМ ОРУЖАНИМ СНАГАМА 1944–1948; Summary/Abstract: Already during the war leadership of Yugoslav Communist movement realized importance of intelligence and counter-intelligence services. After several decisions, in May 1944, in small town of Drvar in Bosnia, a creation of Department for the protection of people (OZNA) has been decided. It encompassed already existing departments and units created for intelligence work as well counter-intelligence defense of liberated territories and rear of partisan combat units. After the war, in 1946, jurisdiction between civilian and military counter-intelligence has been divided so a new Counter intelligence service has been created (KOS). Together with communist party structures within the army it became implementer of new ideology and it’s social and moral values. Main enemies beside different political opponents from the ranks of former war enemies were saboteurs, deserters and passive opponents of the new ideology. Through mechanism of informers and associates KOS operatives became able to monitor and control opinions and reactions of not only rank-and-files but as well their superior officers. As elsewhere in the armed forces special attention was paid to its national structures, level of education of officers, as well representation of party cadres. Often, mistakes were made caused by ill-prepared or incompetent informers or operatives what often led to unjustified accusations. All this was especially visible within the ranks of Corpse for national defense (KNOJ) –special unit created to protect state borders and assist KOS in its fight against“internal enemy”.

: ОТОМАНСКИ РАТНИ ПЛАНОВИ И ПРВИ ОКТОБАР–ДЕЦЕМБАР 1912; Summary/Abstract: Sudden and, for most of contemporary observers, unexpected defeat of Ottoman imperial army in First Balkan War of 1912-1913 in previous decades was interpreted differently. Within many explanations which tried to blame overall situation in Ottoman army related to demoralized and untrained conscriptsor unrealistic and alienated members of officers corpse equally important place is has aspect of military reforms in related to war planning and preparations. Following German models Ottoman General Staff has created several variants of war plan for eventual conflict against its Balkan neighbors.Complexity of this issue was even strengthen by the fact that despite many improvements military reforms were far from concluded and completed because of lack of trained officers, technical and transport units or modern guns and machineguns. Other issue was the fact that modern training system did not encompass reserve units as well. Also, majority of units were deployed in the Balkans, while majority of reservist were supposed to come from central and eastern Anatolia.In addition, reluctance of Ottoman military leadership to follow military logic and accept initial inferiority after which eventual counter-offensive would follow led to series of mistakes which culminated in decision to initiate offensive action on all fronts despite the inferiority and uncompleted mobilization.Outcome was disastrous and led to loss of almost all Ottoman possessions in Europe.

: Од признања до прекида (Југославија и Израел 1948–1967); Summary/Abstract: After the recognition of Israel in 1948, Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations with newly created state. In close cooperation between the two countries a number of issues were raised (assets of Yugoslav Jews who had went to Israel, trade, military and cultural cooperation, etc.). Israel strived for buying Yugoslav weapons and Tito’s mediating in the organization of a secret Israeli-Arab meeting, which the Yugoslav side was avoiding by delaying agreement. In an effort to strengthen its international position, in 1954, in the contacts with Yugoslav representatives, Israel requested the opportunity to join the Balkan Pact. Also, Israel needed the Yugoslav support in voting for the resolutions at the United Nations in order to strengthen its position in relation to the Arab countries, so it looked with distrust at the Yugoslav-Arab closer contacts. One of the challenges in the relations between the two countries was the Israeli-Arab war in 1956, which Yugoslavia condemned as an Israeli aggression. Wishing to strengthen and improve relations with Yugoslavia, Israel insisted on Tito’s visit. Late in the fifties and in the early sixties, the establishment of closer links and raising diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level was sought. Yugoslavia and Josip Broz Tito, looking at their position through the Non-Aligned Movement and relations with Arab countries, looked at Israel with diplomatic measuredness, from a distance, and it seemed that there were no progress. Differences with regard to mutual relations were at their peak during the Israeli-Arab war in 1967, whereupon diplomatic relations were severed.

: Одред Југословенске Народне Армије на Синају 1956-1967. Скица за тему; Summary/Abstract: Participation of the Yugoslav People’s Army in the peacekeeping operations represent an extremely important topic. Within this arrangement, the most durable and most comprehensive was participation in the peacekeeping forces of the United nations in Sinai. In the national historical science that topic is completely unsearched. There is certain, pretty fragmentary and incomplete, scientific and memoir literature. On the other hand, the available archives kept in several archive institutions contains numerous source data on that topic. Smaller part of the relevant archives is still inaccessible. For the research in this theme there is signifi cant scientifi c and practical interest. Future research which would be based on the rules of the historical science would have to be based on a broader insight in the studied problems. Analysis of the political and military aspect of the Yugoslav engagement during the peacekeeping operation in Sinai is of extreme importance. Besides, the problem must be viewed also on the level of the influences of social and economic factors. Final analysis of available relevant sources and literature would give a complete picture on the character of the Yugoslav activities in that peacekeeping operation during the years of intensive cold war turbulences.

: Окупирана Србија у извештајима италијанског посланства у Београду (1941-1943); Summary/Abstract: During the Second World War, the Italian envoy in Belgrade had no authority to communicate directly with local administrations. However, the reports of Italian diplomats on the situation in occupied Serbia cast a different light and give a more detailed picture of the many events and processes. They were based on personal insight, interviews with the official representatives of Germany in Serbia, and also on indirect contacts with Serbian officials in the administration under occupation. Those contacts were maintained through trusted mediators. During the two first war years, Italian diplomats daily followed the situation in the country and in the city, the functioning of the German military command, and important leaders including General Milan Nedić, General Dragoljub Draža Mihailović, Kosta Pećanac, and Dimitrije Ljotić, as well as their asociates. The man behind most of the reports was experienced diplomat Francesco Mameli. the Italian envoy in Belgrade from 1940 to 1943. Of particular importance are testimonies gained through direct contacts with representatives of the Serbian occupation apparatus. They reveal many hidden details of a turbulent and complex period in Yugoslav history, including the negotiations between Italian Legation personnel and General Milan Nedić during the spring of 1942.

: Окупирано подручје Јулијске крајине у политици југословенске владе (1945–1947); Summary/Abstract: Relation of the Yugoslav government to the occupied territory of the Julian March was based on the attitude that it was disputable area, which should be annexed to Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government carried on continuity of the Yugoslav Royal Government’s policy. In achieving this goal it used diplomatic, military and economic resources. Through the Yugoslav military administration in the territory of the Julian March, with the practical actions in terrain, the Yugoslav government made efforts to create conditions which would allow annexation of the Julian March to Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference. Such efforts were the most expressed in the part of the Julian March under the rule of the Yugoslav military administration through emphasizing the Yugoslav character of that area and its administrative connection with Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government carried out significant propaganda and political activities also in the area under the allied military administration. Such activities were the most expressed in the city of Trieste. Obstacles for the operation of the Yugoslav government were different administrative obligations, assumed by signing the Belgrade and Duino agreements. Various difficulties in implementing the assumed obligations were also a good excuse for imposing its own solutions. In anticipation of a favorable decision at the Peace Conference, the Yugoslav government sought to ensure the most favorable diplomatic positions for annexation of the Julian March to the Yugoslav state.

: Организација граничне службе у југословенским оружаним снагама од краја Другог светског рата до резолуције Информбироа 1948. године; Summary/Abstract: Unlike the case of its predecessor first months of socialist Yugoslavia haven’t been marked with disputes over the borders and their lines. One by one border lines were possessed by the troops of Corpse of national defense of Yugoslavia –military unit designed for special assignment, such as protection of the borders. During first days of their service its units encountered many obstacles and challenges, from destroyed border posts and lack of manuals till multitude of illegal transits, mostly towards the West. In time, regular border security service has been organized. New border posts have been constructed and old one renovated. New rules and regulations have been adopted, as well new formation of units. Regular training of dogs followed together with creation of border intelligence service. While conditions on borders with Western countries was tensed marked by occasional border clashes and illegal transits general situation on borders with Eastern countries can be described as relaxed. However, Resolution of Cominform in 1948 brought major changes in overall position of socialist Yugoslavia in international relations which inevitably had huge impact on situation on Yugoslav borders.

: ПЕСИМИЗАМ И АНТИЦИПАЦИЈА ВЕЛИКОГ РАТА У ЛИКОВНОМ ОПУСУ УРОША ПРЕДИЋА; Summary/Abstract: Урош Предић је рођен 1857. у Орловату у Банату, тада делу Аустроугарске монархије. Школске године 1876⁄77. уписао је Академију ликовних уметности у Бечу. Године 1876, подстакнут сукобима у Црној Гори и Босни, насликао је прву верзију Босанских бегунаца. Након одласка из Беча Предић се обрео у Берлину, Минхену и другим центрима германског света у којима је могао да упозна савремене тенденције у сликарству, као и модерна културна и идејна струјања. Особито су декадентни песимизам, као и симболистичка струјања, могли да утичу на сазревање младог интелектуалца и његов даљи развојни пут. Крајем XIX и почетком XX века дошло је до отуђености појединаца у време рађања великих колективитета и свеопште милитаризације друштва. До 1914. године насликао је низ слика прожетих песмистичним патосом, од којих се неколицина посредно може окарактерисати као антиратне и антиегзистенцијалне представе. У време Великог рата насликао је неколицину утопијских слика које су посредно исказивале уметников хуманистички и антиратни став. Тотално разарање и деструкција изазвани Првим светским ратом погодовали су тескобној Предићевој природи да по окончању сукоба наслика Косовску девојку, иконичну слику српског народа.

: ПОЛЕМИКЕ ОКО МЕЂУНАРОДНОГ РАТНОГ ПРАВА У ЧАСОПИСУ РАТНИК КРАЈЕМ XIX ВЕКА; Summary/Abstract: Articles from the magazine Warrior indicate that Serbian legal and military public has shown an early interest in wartime law and its codification.Interestingly, the generals from different armies, as harsh realists, have presented nearly identical complaints in the international law of war. It must,however, be emphasized that von Moltke did it in a more diplomatic manner while Dragomirov brutally challenged the introduction of the laws of war. The main objection of soldiers is still true today: What force would make armed forces (the state) comply with the norms of the military law? Even in the present state of existence of supranational organizations such as the UN, it is difficult to achieve this in practice. However, comparing the absence of any international laws of war and the existing norms that sometimes are respected and sometimes are not, it seems to us that still much progress has been made establishing the law and proclaiming its obligation. The articles of Prof. Geršićare considered to be the initial steps taken in Serbia.

: ПРВИ ШУМАДИЈСКИ ПАРТИЗАНСКИ ОДРЕД ОД ОСНИВАЊА ОДРЕДА ДО СЛОМА УСТАНКА У СРБИЈИ (ЈУН−ДЕЦЕМБАР 1941); Summary/Abstract: Тhe First Šumadian Partisan Detachment was one of the first antifascist units established in Yugoslavia after the beginning of the occupation. A few days after its establishment, on July 1, 1941, in the village of Gornja Trešnjevica, the Detachment entered into actions that were multiplying over time. During 1941 it operated primarily in the territory of the central Šumadija around Aranđelovac, Topola, Lazarevac and Rudnik, undertaking smaller actions in the region of Čačak and Gornji Milanovac. Imortant battles were fought against Germans near Bistrica, Čumić, Krćevac and during the siege of Lazarevac, then, against units of Milan Nedić government in Belanovica and Rudnik and chetniks of Draža Mihailović in Čačak region. During the action of breaking down the uprising, Тhe First Šumadian Partisan Detachment was engaged in an unsuccessful defense of Rudnik and Gornji Milanovac. After the breakdown of the uprising, the Detachment withdrew with the majority of the partisan forces towards the southwest of Serbia. Later, combatants became part of the First and Second Proletarian Brigades. Meanwhile, a small part of the combatants stayed in the Šumadija area, but soon most of them were arrested: some were killed, some interned, and some, after release, became inactive. In the spring of 1942, about ten combatants decided to reestablish the Detachment and enter in smaller actions in Aranđelovac area.

: ПРЕГЛЕД СРПСКО-ТУРСКОГ РАТОВАЊА НА ДРИНИ (1804–1815); Summary/Abstract: Since June of 1804, one of the goals in Serbia’s war plans has been to liberate most of the Eyalet of Bosnia, which resulted in 10 years of a war campaign on the Drina River. Until the summer of 1806, there were no significant developments in that region. The 1806 attack on Belgrade by the insurgent army prompted the Bosnian vizier Husref Mehmed Pasha to send 3,000 soldiers across the Drina River where they have been badly defeated in the battle on the Mišar hill near the town of Šabac. However, the great success of the insurgent army could not change the situation between the two opposing sides. In the years to come, both Karađorđe's and the Turkish army crossed the Drina River on several occasions, but neither of them had successful campaigns. The Turkish response to the Serbian offensive in the spring of 1809 was the counteroffensive that started in the summer of the same year, which was the start of the final clash with Serbia from 1812 to 1815. As the military activities on the Drina River intensified, the Turkish army in the Eyalet of Bosnia mobilized up to 80,000 army men in preparation for the final campaign against the insurgent forces in Serbia. In September of 1813, the Turkish army won the victory in the decisive battle and left the territory from the Drina River to Belgrade completely clear of the insurgents for the following two years.

: План реорганизације штаба врховне команде српске војске из 1918.; Summary/Abstract: The Serbian Supreme Command, based on the organization used during the Balkan Wars, was formed at the beginning of the First World War. The Supreme Command was the highest headquarters of the Serbian operational army and provided command, control, and administrative and logistical support to the entire operational army. At the beginning of the War, it sublimated earlier peacetime functions of the Serbian General Staff and the Ministry of Defence. Field Marshal (vojvoda) Živojin Mišić, who became the Chief of the General Staff in June 1918, began the Supreme Command’s reorganization. The reorganization was based on an analysis of the requirements of the Serbian troops on the Thessaloniki Front, as well as on previous war experiences. Field Marshal Mišić’s main innovation was to separate the Operations from the Administration Directorates. Colonel Dragutin Milutinović, one of the most experienced and well educated Serbian officers, was determined to propose a new organizational structure. He elaborated in detail the new organizational model of the Staff of the Serbian Supreme Command: the Staff was split into two parts, Operations and Administration Directorates; two new functions of Deputy Chief of Staff were introduced; some new directorates were formed (Cabinet of the General Staff, Intelligence); the functions of certain elements were precisely defined, and а clear chain of command was established. Colonel Milutinović's proposal was accepted but never implemented due to the intense preparation for the breakthrough of the Thessaloniki Front. After the First World War, these concepts of the reorganzation of the Staff of the Serbian Supreme Command were incorporated into the formation of the new General Staff, War Staff of the Supreme Command, and Ministry of Army and Navy of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

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