Vojnoistorijski glasnik

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Vojnoistorijski glasnik is a scientific journal of the Institute for Strategic Research. The journal was founded in 1950 as a journal of the Military History Institute and in the meantime has undergone many changes in terms of concept, content, design and frequency of publication.


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Ронилачка служба југословенске Краљевске морнарице
Ронилачка служба југословенске Краљевске морнарице
Summary/Abstract: The paper deals with the history of the navy diving service in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with the special attention given to the divers training. The Yugoslav Royal Navy Diving School has been active for over thirteen years (1927–1941). In that period, 42 diving courses were organized and 207 candidates (35 submarine officers, 29 non-commissioned officers and 143 sailors) successfully passed the final exam, diving with Siebe Gorman Deep See Diving Dress. In accordance with the high-quality programs, those courses were executed systematically, lasting two months for officers, 4–7 months for non-commissioned officers and 6–12 months for sailors. Thanks to the competent guidance, first by Mr. A. Polak (the founder and long-lasting chief diving instructor of Austro-Hungarian Navy Diving School), and later by his pupil and collaborator Mr. J. Komadina, many dives were executed during training, without any serious incident. It is very important to point out that those divers, after training and final examination tests, dived in open sea to the depth of 60 meters and sometimes several meters more – it was an exceptional depth for that time. During the dives, the divers were supplied with air by manual diving pumps only without any emergency air storage. The divers executed even more risky dives without any recompression chamber at the diving station, in spite the fact that the Yugoslave Royal Navy had a modern Siebe Gorman two-compartment recompression chamber in the period of 1932–1941. This chamber was never installed because the appropriate compressor had not been purchased.
СМРТНЕ ПОСЛЕДИЦЕ ЕПИДЕМИЈЕ ШПАНСКЕ ГРОЗНИЦЕ 1918. ГОДИНЕ У КАМЕНИЧКОМ СРЕЗУ ВАЉЕВСКОГ ОКРУГА
СМРТНЕ ПОСЛЕДИЦЕ ЕПИДЕМИЈЕ ШПАНСКЕ ГРОЗНИЦЕ 1918. ГОДИНЕ У КАМЕНИЧКОМ СРЕЗУ ВАЉЕВСКОГ ОКРУГА
Summary/Abstract: It is estimated that the Spanish flu pandemic, which affected the entire planet from 1918 to 1919, affected about five hundred million people, or one-third of the world's population at that time, and killed about fifty million people. The disease was noticed among Serbian soldiers in Corfu in April 1918, and in May among soldiers on the Thessaloniki Front, but without fatal consequences. During the summer, fatalities are also noticed, mainly due to lung compaction. Then the epidemic was spotted in occupied Serbia as well. Just in time for the breakthrough of Thessaloniki Front, (15th of September) a new wave of epidemics started, this time it was fatal. Many soldiers remained lying and dying along the way established military hospitals. Some soldiers successfully arrived at their homes but then passed away, and some found empty homes. In occupied Serbia, mass dying began before liberation. In the region of Valjevo, the first deaths occurred in early October, but massively dying started in late October. It lasted less than two months. Then, by the beginning of the spring of 1919, sporadic deaths due to „pneumonia” were seen as a common complication of Spanish flu, which does not necessarily mean that the epidemic had stopped, but that its end did not carry any fatal consequences. In the lowlands of the Valjevo region, mortality was relatively low (in the parish of the church in Rabrovica - 0,44%), in the hilly area mortality rate was slightly higher (parish of the church in Brankovina - 1,32%), and in the high mountain areas, it was very high. These areas also include the territories of the former district of Kamenica in Valjevo region. According to the 1916 census, it had a population of 20, 289, and in about two months after the epidemic struck, about 1000 people, accurately 5% of the population, died.The least deaths were in the village of Dragijevica, 1,13%, and the highest in Tupanci, 9,81%.
СНАБДИЈЕВАЊЕ УСТАНИКА У БОСНИ 1875–1878.
СНАБДИЈЕВАЊЕ УСТАНИКА У БОСНИ 1875–1878.
Summary/Abstract: The paper brings information on the part of the rebel life dealing with daily struggle to keep the men fed and dressed during the 1875 to 1878 uprising in Bosnia. The fighters did not wear uniforms. Many of them wore their traditional ethnic wear: Bosnian, Montenegrin, Herzegovinian, Dalmatian, and Turkish. Some wore uniforms of Austrian frontiersmen. Colonel Mileta Despotović decided to change this practice and ordered a thousand new overcoats, jackets, pants and shoes in order to have his troops dressed like Serbian army. During the campaign, the men would sleep in any place that was safe. The food was scarce and not very nutritious. The maize porridge, cooked until very dry, was the main food. In the days of celebration of victory or on the family patron saint's day, the rebels would drink wine and slaughter lambs and other cattle. Except for the maize porridge, the men would sometimes have various kinds of beans. Sometimes, the troops were so malnourished and poorly supplied they became depressed, which in turn jeopardized the whole military operation. Organized plundering has almost been made a rule since the day one of the uprising. Until colonel Despotović came from Serbia to become a head commander, looters would regularly raid Muslim villages to steal food from the villagers. They would take cattle, cheese and other dairy, wheat, oat, c orn, beans and other produce. Serb and Catholic villages have not been spared either. When the food was in short supply, the men went foraging for berries and mushrooms. They would drink wine and plum schnapps, even beer could have been found in the Mrkonjić's camp. They smoked tobacco and some of their commanders, like Mrkonjić, smoked cigarettes.
СОВЈЕТСКИ ВОЈНИ ИЗАСЛАНИК У БЕОГРАДУ О УЗРОЦИМА ПОРАЗА ВОЈСКЕ КРАЉЕВИНЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ У АПРИЛСКОМ РАТУ 1941.
СОВЈЕТСКИ ВОЈНИ ИЗАСЛАНИК У БЕОГРАДУ О УЗРОЦИМА ПОРАЗА ВОЈСКЕ КРАЉЕВИНЕ ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ У АПРИЛСКОМ РАТУ 1941.
Summary/Abstract: У раду се на основу до сада непознатих и некоришћених извора совјетског порекла анализира поглед совјетског војног изасланика у Београду генерала Александра Самохина на узроке пораза Војске Краљевине Југославије у краткотрајном Априлском рату 1941. Рад садржи преглед совјетских информација и анализа о стању у југословенској војсци и њеним борбеним квалитетима уочи Другог светског рата, војним припрема непосредно пред почетак рата, борбеним дејствима током Априлског рата и анализу бројности, јачине и припремљености немачких војних снага које су учествовале у нападу на Југославију.
СРБИ И „ДУГА ВОЈНА“ 1443/1444. ГОДИНЕ
СРБИ И „ДУГА ВОЈНА“ 1443/1444. ГОДИНЕ
Summary/Abstract: In the long history of the crusades, the Long Campaign was the only “holywar” against the “enemies of Christianity” in which Serbs took part, and it wasthe only crusade which was led by a Serbian ruler. Also, it was the only crusadewhich had had, as one of its leaders, an Orthodox Christian monarch. DespotGeorge (Đurađ) Branković saw an opportunity for the restoration of the Serbiandespotate in this campaign. However, it should be noted, that the idea of acrusade, under the Pope’s patronage, in which the Ottomans would be expelledfrom Europe, was present in the minds of the Serbian rulers, since the time of the tsar Stefan Dušan. In the Long War, Serbs had a significant role, especiallydespot George. He was one of the main propagators of the war and one of its main financiers (His estimated wealth of 170 000 ducats, which he deposited in Dubrovnik, show that he was among the wealthiest monarchs of his time). He was also most experienced strategists, a highly-esteemed member of the War Council, whose opinion was always welcomed in critical situations. Historical sources call him ''pathfinder''- considering his engagement in wars of Bayazit's sons, he had excellent knowledge of paths between Belgrade and Consantinople,. During the campaign despot had a couple of conflicts with John Hunyadi, the campaign’s main strategist. The first onflict was in 1443, concerningthe continuation of war operations during the cold winter, and the second onewas in January of 1444, concerning the retreat of the army into Hungary. If weaccept modern historical estimates, that the crusader army numbered around 25 000 warriors, and considering the claim from cardinal's letter, that 8000 Serbian cavalry and infantrymen under the despot's command were part of that army, along with despot’s troops that marched from Hungary, as true, then the conclusion is that the Serbs (and others under despot’s command) made up the third of the Christian coalition's entire force. During the war operations a significant part of the Serbian Despotate had been liberated (territory placed between various cities and castles: Teočak–Belgrade–Bovan–Niš–Pirot–Novo Brdo–Srebrenica). The retreat of the crusade army caused these achievements to be only temporary. Hungarian delay of new war operations and renewed Ottoman conquest of Serbian cities had forced despot George into an attempt to restore his Despotate peacefully, through negotiations with the sultan, which, in turn, had huge consequences for the next crusader campaign, that ended withthe defeat of Christian forces at Varna. It is worth mentioning that two greatestvictories of Christian forces, the one at Niš and the one at Kunovica, because ofwhich the contemporaries gained an impression of triumph over the Ottomans,were achieved on the battlefields of Serbian Despotate. The bold campaign of1443–1444 was the deepest breakthrough of the Christian armies into the territoryof Ottoman empire, up until the Great Turkish war of 1689 and Russian-Turkish war of 1878. Even though this campaign is generally considered as unsuccessfulby the western historians, from the Serbian perspective, it was veryimportant in context of the restoration of the Serbian state in summer of 1444.
СТАВ ФРАНЦУСКЕ ПОВОДОМ БОМБАРДОВАЊА БЕОГРАДА 1862. ГОДИНЕ
СТАВ ФРАНЦУСКЕ ПОВОДОМ БОМБАРДОВАЊА БЕОГРАДА 1862. ГОДИНЕ
Summary/Abstract: After the Turkish bombing of Belgrade on 17th June 1862, the French Consul Eugene Tastu appeared to be the most active and he contributed greatly in settling down the metters between the Turks and Serbs. He wrote joint protest note of the consuls, where they judged the violent act of Turkish Pasha and the Belgrade Fortress Garnisone. The Prince and the Serbian Government wanted to use this event as a cause for expulsion of Turks from Serbia. The suggestion to settle the conflict between Turks and Serbs in the Conference of Great Powers was made by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Edouard Thouvenel, and the Principality enabled the support of Paris and St. Petersburg. In the Conference held in the Constantinople suburb Kanlidza from June to September of 1862, the French Ambassador Lionel Moustier successfully defended Serbian attitude. With his eloquency and pacifying attitude, he disabled Turkish Government in imposing difficult and demeaning conditions to the Principality: spreading the area of Belgrade Fortress and demolishing the part of the city of significant buildings and trading streets. Thanks to the French Ambassador, Serbia got the guarantee that they would not be bombed again. The demolition of Fortress of Uzice and Sokol and the expulsion of the Muslims from Serbia was predicted by the Protocol of Kanlidza from 8th September 1862 in accordance with the clauses of Hatti­sherif from 1830 and 1833, including Belgrade. Still, under the pressure of the powers which supported Turkey, such as Great Britain, as well as foreign political affairs connected to the expedition in Mexico, France had to give up the support to the main Serbian demand for Turkish garnisones in Belgrade, Sabac, Smederevo and Kladovo to leave the Principality. The Government in Paris insisted on the precise application of the clauses of the Protocole of Kanlidza Conference. In the first half of 1863 during the work of Military Committee in Belgrade, which was in charge of setting the limits of Belgrade Fortress Area, the French representative Joseph d’Andlau managed to get the support of other commissaire for his solutions, having made the compromise between the needs to defend the Fortress and the needs of the Serbian population.
Санитетско обезбеђење одреда Југословенске Народне Армије на Синају 1956 – 1967.
Санитетско обезбеђење одреда Југословенске Народне Армије на Синају 1956 – 1967.
Summary/Abstract: The detachment of the Yugoslav National Army in Sinai within the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces stayed in the territory of Egypt from November 1956 till June 1967. It was the unit of specific organizational – formational structure adapted to executing special tasks in the dessert. As the detachment was an independent unit, in terms of personnel, organization and logistic, it had in its composition special medical elements. Numerically small units of medical service had a broad range of special tasks from the basic medical protection of the personnel to taking care of their hygiene. During the stay of the Yugoslav soldiers in Sinai, the medical elements of the Detachment fought against series of problems. Medical personnel trained to work in the desert conditions represented completely new experience since in their practice so far they never encountered such circumstances. First of all, there was a great problem of different contagious diseases characteristic for that region, different desert reptiles and insects, bad hygienic conditions in the field, but also occasional cases of neurolability caused by the life conditions and accomplishing the specific tasks in the field. Nevertheless, in spite of a series of objective difficulties, medical elements of the Detachment succeeded in accomplishing their basic specific tasks in the field of medical and hygienic protection of the personnel.
Саша Станојевић, Стварање Балканског савеза 1912
Саша Станојевић, Стварање Балканског савеза 1912
Summary/Abstract: Sasa Stanojevic, Creation of the Balkans alliance 1912, Kosovska Mitrovica: Philosophical fakultet, Prokuplje: Istorijski Arhiv Toplice, Narodni muzej Toplica, 2020, 362 p.
Скривена армија (совјетски држављани у Вермахту и СС током Другог светског рата)
Скривена армија (совјетски држављани у Вермахту и СС током Другог светског рата)
Summary/Abstract: The successes of Germany and the USSR in the war of 1941-1945 were significantly influenced, among the other things, by one neglected factor: sudden change in the disposition of the population towards the German troops. Factor of the disposition of the population influenced not only the change in the military luck, but also the activity of the militant collaborationism. According to the calculations of the contemporary historians “general number of the USSR citizens and emigrants, who spent at least some time in service with Wehrmacht troops, SS, police or paramilitary units, amounted to approximately 1,200,000 men (including up to 700 thousand Slovenes, up to 300 thousand representatives of the Baltic people, up to 200 thousand representatives of Tataro-Turkistan, Caucasian and other smaller nations)” with the maximum number at one time of 800-900 thousands. Numerous units were formed by nations which were “annexed” to the USSR on the eve of the war: the 14th division “Galicia”, 15th and 19th Letonian SS division “Galicia”, 15th and 19th Letonian division SS, 20th Estonian division. Western Belarusia and Lithuania did not have independent SS divisions but therefore they gave more police battalions which were used in suppressing the partisan movement in the northwestern parts of Russia, in the eastern Ukraine and Byelorussia. As early as in November 1941, Hitler ordered formation of four national legions – Turkistan, Georgian, Armenian and Caucasian-Magometan. They formed later on many police and military regiments and the 162nd Turkistan division of Wehrmacht. The Russians formed, besides many small units, the Kozak cavalier corps which was used for anti-partisan operation in the area of Yugoslavia. The culmination of the policy of using Russian collaborators of the occupiers was reached within the so-called “Lokot region”. As late as in 1945, the division ROA of General Vlasov was formed. After 1991, historiographic fate of the Soviet collaborators varied from rehabilitation to the continuation of the Soviet historiographic traditions.
Скупштинске расправе о војним буџетима Краљевине СХС
Скупштинске расправе о војним буџетима Краљевине СХС
Summary/Abstract: In the moment of creating of new state quality of life in Yugoslavia was quite opposite from the expectations of its inhabitans. Different circumstances contributed to the fact that it was not capable to satisfy even its modest needs thus contributing to certain disillusions of rich and self-sufficient state. In situation marked by constant lack of finances parliamentary debates over the amount of state budget and its distribution questions related to defense expenditure always caused bitter controversies. Opposition parties mostly considered military expenditures as excessive and unnecessary not taking into consideration realities of Yugoslav position in international relations as well conditions within the army as well its needs. Ruling parties were pressed by the demands for reduction of military in general as well shortening of service period, development of air force or navy at the expense of ground forces, reductions of officer’s salary supplements, serving in areas closer to the actual places of residence, budget support to the local authorities for the maintenance of army barracks. Defense ministries considered saving measures were already bringing results on everyday basis, while certain changes could not be undertaken due to the provisions of ruling laws, and that some of them already distorted normal functioning of the armed forces. Many of these remarks were exaggerated and motivated by political interests, while remarks on the subject of underdevelopment of navy and air forces were contradictory with demands for reductions of defense budget.
Слика османске војске у делу једног немуслиманског поданика - Мурадџа Д’Осон и његов Tableau général de l’empire Othoman
Слика османске војске у делу једног немуслиманског поданика - Мурадџа Д’Осон и његов Tableau général de l’empire Othoman
Summary/Abstract: Ignacius Muradgea d’Ohsson (1740-1807) was a little-known non-Muslim Ottoman historian and the author of one of the most significant works about Turkish history, the Tableau Général de l’Empire Othoman. This book was written and published during his sojourn in Paris in three luxurious in folio volumes, designed for Western European Christian aristocrats. Muradgea claimed that, unlike the writings of previous historians, his opus was based on Ottoman sources. In addition, he insisted that everything that had previously been written about the Ottomans was false. Tableau Généralis no ordinary history, but an overview of the Turkish government institutions, ceremonies, and customs. Muradgea wrote about the Ottoman Army in a section that describes contemporary Ottoman institutions in the second half of the 18th century. All corps of the continental troops, including naval forces, were exhaustively listed. On the one hand, Tableau gives considerable information on the origins of the military units, particularly the Janissaries. The author considered them one of the most important factors of the former Ottoman power, but also a threat to state stability and the security of its subjects. Also, he emphasized obsolete Turkish military technology and the poor education of the officer corps. The only way to restore Ottoman military forces, according to the author, was the reform that could be carried out by an enlightened sultan. That sultan was in fact Selim III (1789-1807), a founder of the New Army (Nizâmi Cedîd), in whose activities d’Ohsson had been included as a consultant for his knowledge of the western military model. Despite Muradgea has rarely impersonated historical events, he devoted a lot of space to the 1774 terms of peace in Kucukkajnardja between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, subtly underlining the danger of Russia. On the other hand, his descriptions are often full of completely irrelevant details, while the basic information on the issue is missing. Frequently, his information about the troop numbers is incomplete or inaccurate. Although he had insisted on army reform, he mentioned military changes in the time of Selim III (Nizâmı Cedîd, for example) only a few times or he did not mention it at all (e.g., in the case of the establishment of the Imperial military engineering school in 1795, in which he had participated). However, with all these imperfections, Tableau Général is a unique work in the historiography of the Ottoman Empire, providing a positive view of the Turks, which was a rarity in Christian Europe. In sum, this study provides insight into all the corps of the Ottoman Army and indicates its problems and struggles in the 18th century.
Слободан Ђукић, Страни утицаји на развој српске војне доктрине у XIX и првој деценији XX века
Слободан Ђукић, Страни утицаји на развој српске војне доктрине у XIX и првој деценији XX века
Summary/Abstract: Prikaz knjige Strani uticaji na razvoj srpske vojne doktrine u XIX i prvoj deceniji XX veka od Slobodana Đukića

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