Vojnoistorijski glasnik
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Vojnoistorijski glasnik is a scientific journal of the Institute for Strategic Research. The journal was founded in 1950 as a journal of the Military History Institute and in the meantime has undergone many changes in terms of concept, content, design and frequency of publication.
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- РАСПОДЕЛА НУЗУЛА У КАДИЛУЦИМА РУМЕЛИЈЕ ЗА ОСМАНСКИ ПОХОД НА УГАРСКУ 1543. ГОДИНЕ
- Summary/Abstract: Рад представља превод пописа нузула, који садржи податке о количини житарица прикупљених у санџацимаи кадилуцима на територији Румелије, ради опремања османскe војскe током похода на Угарску 1543. У уводном делу рада, објашњена је сама институција нузула и начин накоји је овај порез убиран.
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- РАТНА ФОТОГРАФИЈА КАО ФОТО-ДОКУМЕНТ
- Summary/Abstract: Serbian war photography came to life only during the First Balkan War, with Risto Marjanović, who came to Belgrade from the New York Herald in Paris at the request of Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis and became an official photo reporter at the Supreme Command. The entire photographic opus of Dragiša Stojadinović can be divided into five stylistically and chronologically different units, which, however, cannot be best seen as separate. The first consists of war photographs, primarily those from the First World War, which show military activities and dead bodies; the second consists of individual and group portraits with a large number of soldiers created in the interwar or passive periods of the war; in the third, photographs of prominent civilians appear; the fourth and fifth units, which are stylistically the furthest from the others, are family photographs taken after the war, but also pre-war, war and post-war photographs of which Stojadinović is not the author, in which he is personally depicted in military uniform, with his family or immediately after his arrest in “Glavnjača” and in prison in Sremska Mitrovica. Although each unit can be a photodocument, only by connecting them is a valid photo documentation obtained that fully illuminates Dragiša's entire oeuvre, especially if we take into account the fact that they are thematically different units. The photographs of Ljubiša Valić illustrating the book “Experiences of Sergeant Miladin” (1917) are by no means just an addition to the text. Valić started from a report, more precisely a war photo report, but his photographs show the war Golgotha of Serbian soldiers and civilians during the retreat through Albania in 1915-16. years gained a new quality by connecting with the text. The artist, who is both a photographer and a writer, has a difficult task to achieve the unity of photography and text, and Valić had to adapt his photographs to the book he also wrote, but based on the story of Sergeant Miladin. In this case, the text and the photo did not come from each other, they were created in parallel in the same area. With him, as with Stojadinović, one can see sincere intentions and freedom from any kind of insinuation and pressure from the side. Both of these photographers, as well as the vast majority of Serbian photographers from the First World War, tried to create as realistic a picture as possible, as much as their abilities and knowledge allowed at that time.
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- Раде Ристановић, Београдски Равногорци
- Summary/Abstract: Rade Ristanovic, Belgrade Ravnogorci: Yugoslav Army in the Homeland and Ravnogorski movement in occupied Belgrade 1941–1944, Institute of Contemporary History, Belgrade, 2020, 427 pages.
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- Развитак војне службе као основ формирања властеоског слоја у српској средњовековној држави
- Summary/Abstract: Initial point for this research represented quote from one Serbian medieval writing stating that society consists from three groups: priests, plowmen and soldiers. This division in West Europe actually shaped already in 9th century. Induced by this quote we have tried to establish coherency between developments of military service with creation of privileged nobility. After arrival to the Balkans among local Slavs, therefore among Serbs there is no visible social differentiation based on profession. Social stratification was additionally encouraged by Christianization creating initial very thin layer of clergy. On the other hand, conversion to Christianity contributed to strengthening of ruling houses placing them above the rest of society. Occasional submission of Serbian lands to Byzantine Empire or Bulgaria slow down creation of local elites. Process of political emancipation from Byzantine rule, which started in Doclea during 11th and its successful continuation in Raska during 12 century wouldn’t be feasible without existence of group of “professional soldiers”. Confirmation could be found in writings of Byzantine writers as well in certain archeological sites. By the end of 12th century in Serbia appeared new type o soldier - armored cavalryman. Almost simultaneously appeared group of dependent inhabitants tied to land which was supposed to secure nobility with sufficient revenues. By the beginning of 13th century in hagiographies and charts beside nobility as separate social category appeared soldiers. Analyses of sources showed that both belonged to the class of warriors while nobility was entitled to higher titles and governing positions. In time, soldiers stop being separate social category and enter the ranks of nobility whose main obligation was warfare. By the mid 14th century this was confirmed by the Emperor Dusan Code. Thanks to its privileges nobility clearly differed from Vlachs among whom some were obliged to participate in war.
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- Развој доктрине у војсци Краљевине Србије 1882 – 1903.
- Summary/Abstract: Serbian military thought in the 19th century was influenced by many factors, and most of all the experience from the wars waged against Turkey in 1876 and 1877, and against Bulgaria in 1885, as well as the European military theories, above all the German, then the French and the Austro-Hungarian. Speaking about a phenomenon which in the 19th century was not yet articulated, it may be said that doctrine existed only in Germany and France. As for the other European militaries, including the Serbian, it cannot be said that they had a defined, consolidated doctrine. Regarding the general knowledge, they took most from the Germans, and that was what they considered useful and usable. Among the Serbian military theoreticians, a prevailing position that the art of war integrates both the science and the skills, and that one cannot exist without the other. Officially, the art of war was not divided to the strategy and the tactics, because they were considered to have narrow links and to interweave. However, such division was applied in the theory of the art of war for the purposes of easier studying. Not before the very end of the 19th century, the Army of the Kingdom of Serbia had ready war plans in case of war with potential adversaries, Turkey or Bulgaria. The war plans developed in 1898 represent a basic document for preparation, organization, use and provision of the military in a possible war with Bulgaria and Turkey, and they can be considered a document of strategic significance made operational at the operational and tactical levels. Then, some basic positions of the Serbian military war doctrine were outlined, and under the influence of the German military doctrine, the attack was given priority to the defence.
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- Размена заробљеника између Србије и Бугарске 1913. године (прилог истраживању)
- Summary/Abstract: The unexpected conflict between the recent First Balkan War allies – Serbia and Bulgaria -- came to a conclusion during the bloody Battle of Bregalnica. The large numbers of dead soldiers and prisoners testify to how serious that conflict was. In the middle of the battle, 1,200 Bulgarian prisoners were taken to Belgrade. That event strongly influenced all who were present and watched that strange procession. The Second Balkan War ended with the signing of the peace agreement in Bucharest, followed by the exchange of prisoners between Serbia and Bulgaria. Healthy prisoners were exchanged in September 1913 near Pirot and wounded and sick in October. A problem occurred when the Bulgarian side refused to hand over the rest of the Serbian soldiers before the Macedonian volunteers (who fought for the Bulgarian Army during the Second Balkan War) were handed over to them. Ultimately, the Serbian Government decided to hand over the Macedonian volunteers because they were not citizens of the Kingdom of Serbia at the beginning of the Second Balkan War. Support for their Macedonian commitments was an expression of Bulgarian discontent with the peace agreement’s regulations and an indication of their readiness to continue fighting in order to fulfill their aims in Macedonia.
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- Рат против Србије 1914. и 1915. године (поглед из Аустрије)
- Summary/Abstract: The campaigns of the Austro-Hungarian army against Serbia in 1914 and in combination with the German Empire and Bulgaria in fall 1915 distinguish in their strategic perspective but are quite similar concerning the special characteristics of the fighting going on. Both operations were deeply influenced by tactics of mountain warfare. In 1914 the k. u.k. Headquarter of the Balkan-Forces had to deal with the strategic problem of defending the border to Bosnia-Herzegovina on the one hand and defeating the Serbian Army on the other hand, having not enough forces to fulfill both missions. In addition to that, the Serbian Army – fully experienced in modern mountain warfare and equipped with modern artillery – was fighting on own territory performing high effective in defending their ground and fighting the small war. In combination with already outdated war plans and mistakes in the initial concentrating of all forces, all three offensives led to a total disaster causing enormous casualties for the k. u.k. forces. Because of the agreement of executing a multinational and combined operation on Serbia in 1915, the German Empire and the Kingdom of Bulgaria together with the Austro-Hungarian Army managed to deploy enough forces to defeat the Serbian Army. The allied forces again faced the problems of modern mountain warfare especially slow advancements caused by the lack of streets and communication lines making rapid operations almost impossible. The outnumbered Serbian Army had to face heavy casualties but managed to avoid full annihilation and reached the Adriatic coast for evacuation.
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- Ратни планови војске Краљевине СХС/Југославије 1922-1938.
- Summary/Abstract: Yugoslavia was surrounded after World War I by revisionary neighboring countries that were dissatisfied with the decisions of post-war peace treaty conferences. The greatest threat was posed by Italy, which claimed the right to Balkan territories which had been promised to it by the London Peace Treaty. During the early post-war years, Italy established a protectorate over Albania, replacing the influence of Yugoslavia there. At the same time, Hungary and Bulgaria, countries that had lost the war, were creating armies far bigger than permitted by the treaties. Under these circumstances, and as confirmed by respective war plans, there existed the possibility of conflict with numerous bordering nations. At first, the plans projected war with individual countries, only to take other combinations into consideration, as a result of the increasing military strength in the Balkans. Plans were developed considering the basic idea of military alliances with countries from the Little and Balkan entantes, but also with larger nations and forces bent on enforcing the decisions of the Treaty of Versailles. These war plans were mainly aimed at the neutralization of weaker neighbors, in order to redirect the main forces towards a possible conflict with Italy.
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- Ревизионистичка историографија и савезничко бомбардовање Београда 1944. године (научни есеј)
- Summary/Abstract: У савременој српској историографији намеће се неодложна потреба да се интерпретација догађаја из ХХ века у што већој мери релативизује на основу епохалне идеје и извора о стварности, реализованој у пракси. То се пре свега, односи на историју Југославије. Прво основно мерило требало би да буде спознаја да нам још увек нису доступна најзначајнија документа, што значи да треба успоставити редослед постепеног унапређења научног знања – у оној мери како нам „притичу“ нови документи. Друго, историчари ХХ века требало би да се непрекидно образују у домену теоријско-методолошких иновација. Треће, сви би требало да познају енормну количину савремених научних дела из европске и светске историје. Посебно оних која се тичу југоистока Европе. [...]
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- Регрутни састав војске Србије 1883–1912. Систем позива и неки његови друштвени аспекти
- Summary/Abstract: During the 19th century, many European countries gradually introduced regular military service and this trend was adopted in the Balkans at the end of the 1870s and early 1880s. The system of recruitment and conscription in Serbia was established in 1883 and was changed five times in the following twenty years. However, the basic statistics such as conscription of all male citizens at the age of 20 to 21 years, as well as the model of forming groups based on ages, remained mainly the same. The length of service in the Army was flexible. Under the law of 1883, and its modifications during the time, the social model of the Serbian youths conscripted to military service becomes more understandable. According to the available data, most conscripts were young men from rural areas, and half of them were from the zadruga (a type of rural community). Drafted soldiers were Orthodox Serbs while the percentage of nonOrthodox was practically negligible. Those soldiers were mostly illiterate, more so than soldiers from other European countries.
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- Реституције Југословенске војне имовине из Чехословачке после Другог светског рата – Имовина ВТЗ Крагујевац, Вогошћа, Барич и Обилићево
- Summary/Abstract: In the international law the restitution means the obligation of former enemy state to return the property which was taken by force which was taken from the territory which that state held under occupation. Czechoslovakia, certainly, was not the enemy state, but a part of the Yugoslav property taken by the Germnans during the war finished in the territory of Czecholsovakia, and therefore, in the relations between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia emerged the issue of the restitution of the property. The reason why a part of the teken property finished in Czechoslovakia laid in the fact that the Yugoslav and Czechoslovakian industry cooperated before the war, that Czechoslovakian factories like “Zbrojovka” and “Skoda” delivered machines to the Yugoslav military industry, so that they were relevant to do the dismantling of these machines during the war within the intentions of the Germans to take away the machines from Yugoslavia. Besides, at the territory of Germany after the war, there was a number of machines made in Czechoslovakia which were either taken away from Yugoslavia or produced before the war but on order and probably paid in advance for the Yugoslav factories. In the first case the machines after the war were restituted into Czechoslovakia according to the principle of producer’s origin, and in the second case the Czechoslovakians restituted them stating that they had ownership of them, and these were the reasons for the disputes after the war, since Yugoslavia in both cases claimed the right of ownership over these machines. Due to the fact that before the war MTI Kragujevac cooperated first of all with “Zbrojovka” from Brno, аnd MTI Vogošća with “Skoda” from Plzen, the restitution requests for return of the property of these two institutions were mainly directed to these Czechoslovakian factories. However, all or almost all the Yugoslav requests for return of the property were negatively solved. The Yugoslav authorities did not have enough people to work more eagerly and more systematically on that issue, first of all on the very grounds in Czechoslovakia, so that these issues were solved only by pure correspondence with the Czechoslovakian authorities who answered on all the Yugoslav requests and urges that the demanded goods, first of all machines, were not at the territory of Czechoslovakia, and that the data given by the Yugoslav representatives were incomplete and that the archives of the Czechoslovakian factories were destroyed in war so that it was impossible to check the authenticity of the Yugoslav statements.