Vojnoistorijski glasnik
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Vojnoistorijski glasnik is a scientific journal of the Institute for Strategic Research. The journal was founded in 1950 as a journal of the Military History Institute and in the meantime has undergone many changes in terms of concept, content, design and frequency of publication.
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- Совјетска свакодневица посматрана очима југословенских дипломата 1953–1962. године
- Summary/Abstract: Based on several reports of the Embassy of FPRY, this paper presents the changes occurring in the social and economic life of the Soviet Union in the decade after the death of Stalin. Yugoslav diplomats, relying on the sympathies of the Russian population for a Slavic country, managed to perceive, in an otherwise suspicious environment, certain changes emerging after 1953. When travelling to the Baltic coast, diplomats noted the national intolerance against the Russians. In the economic sphere, improvement in the standard of living was obvious, in spite of enormous expenditure on armament and space exploration.
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- Спасавање архивске грађе Војног архива у току НАТО бомбардовања од марта до јуна 1999. године
- Summary/Abstract: Војни архив био је у саставу Војноисторијског института до 2006. године. У време НАТО бомбардовања Војноисторијски институт био је унутрашња организацијска јединица Савезног министарства за одбрану (при Секретаријату СМО) и најзаслужнија институција што је спасена архивска грађа Војног архива – архивска грађа од непроцењиве вредности за југоисточну Европу, значајна и за светску историју. [...]
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- Споменица погинулих у ратовима 1991–2000. године са подручја Краљевa
- Summary/Abstract: Prikaz Spomenice poginulih u ratovima 1991-2000. godine sa područja Kraljeva od doktora Miloša Timotijevića
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- Сретен Вукосављевић у борби за национално ослобођење од Турака
- Summary/Abstract: Sreten Vukosavljević, a prominent scientist, the founder of sociology of village in Yugoslavia, university professor, fighter against fascism and activist for building a democratic Yugoslavia, early in his career as a teacher, especially after his return from Timočka Krajina to a primary school in Nova Varoš in 1904, proved himself as a true champion of national liberation of his people from the centurieslong Ottoman rule. In April 1912 he became a member of the organization Unification or Death, and soon its leader in Stara Raška. In his struggle he was not reluctant to apply the most radical measures. In spring 1912 he formed a Komita company and took command of it. He crossed the River Lim with that company on 13th September to pursue a Turkish company across Kamena Gora. He got wounded in that battle, but after a short treatment at Ivanjica hospital, he rejoined the fighting. The First Balkan War had already officially begun and he demonstrated remarkable military skills, intelligence and courage in the war. His action during the seizure of Priboj belongs almost to the domain of fantasy.
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- Српске војске у ратовима у Европи и Малој Азији (XII–XIV век)
- Summary/Abstract: During the XII-XIV centuries, Serbian rulers frequently employed their armies in the conflicts beyond the borders of their state. As a consequence of ambitious foreign policies, vassal obligations or concluded alliances with Byzantium, Hungary or Bulgaria, they fought on the various battlefields from Central Europe to Asia Minor. The most notable examples are battles of Pelagonia (1259) and Kressenbrun (1260), expeditions undertaken against Turks in Thrace and Anatolia (1312, 1313) and military aid sent to Byzantium during the various stages of civil wars fought between Andronicus II and Andronicus III (1327), and between John V Paleologus and John VI Cantacuzenus (1342-43, 1352). Serbian armies also served mighty Tatar leader Nogai (1294-97) and after the battle of Velbazhd (1330), they provided armed support to friendly political faction in Bulgaria. The rulers exercised firm control over their military resources. These primarily consisted of domestic allodial and feudal nobility, but also of foreign oriental and western mercenaries. Although there is a distinction in the sources between these two groups, one may observe the tendency to organize a unified army, irrespective of its members’ origin. During this period, Serbian armies grew up in size; detachment that paricipated in the Battle of Pelagonia in 1259 amounted no more than 1000 lightly equipped riders, while expeditionary corps sent to Byzantium in 1352 consisted of no less than 4.000 cavalrymen. Although in the twelfth century infantry played the most important role in Serbian armament and tactics, during the thirteenth and fourteenth century cavalry gradually became dominant. Sources testify that Serbian armies who fought abroad mainly consisted of cavalry units. Much attention has been cast to horse breeding and several notices from the sources show that domestic nobility was abundant in riding animals. However, according to the eyewitness’ testimonies, their horses were small in stature and their fighting qualities were generally weaker than in the case of their western and byzantine counterparts. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, presence of heavy mounted troops was probably limited only to western mercenary corpses and Serbian cavalry was predominantly light. Its character was determined by the quality of available horses, rather than arms and armor and important changes in this aspect took place only during the era of Ottoman conquests, when oriental horses were introduced in the Balkans in larger numbers.
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- Став Француске према испоруци оружја Србији 1862. године
- Summary/Abstract: In the events related to the supply of weapon in 1862 France favoured Serbia and Romania. This approach was determined by its policy regarding the Eastern Question, which was still favoured by Emperor Napoleon III. However, the new minister of foreign affairs Drouyn de Lhuys belonged to the faction that was giving priority to other foreign policy issues. The French minister and his government did not want to detach themselves from England and Austria and side only with Russia. This made them willing to made concessions in the negotiations with the representatives of those big powers. The French government wanted Turkey, Austria and England to take a more moderate course, which would allow for an outcome of the dispute that would be favourable to both Principalities.
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- Стиг Ферстер о војној историографији данас
- Summary/Abstract: Војна историографија код нас већ дуже времена не прати савремена достигнућа ове историјске дисциплине у свету. Последње значајне радове на ту тему дао је још Петар Томац педесетих, шездесетих и седамдесетих година ХХ века. Редакцијски одбор Војноисторијског гласника последњих година покушава да донекле попуни насталу празнину објављивањем радова посвећених методологији војне историје као научне дисциплине. Тако су у двобројима за 2004. и 2006. годину објављени текстови немачког војног историчара др Бернарда Киарија и бугарског посленика ове научне дисциплине, др Игњата Криворова. Овога пута доносимо избор из текста др Стига Ферстера (Stig Förster) ,,Vom Kriege“ Überlegungen zu modernen Militärgesihte који прати савремене светске трендове у овој научној дисциплини. Др Стиг Ферстер (1951) је професор Опште савремене историје на Универзитету у Берну (Швајцарска). Објавио је неколико радова из области војне историје од којих издвајамо: ,,Barbaren” und ,,Weise Teufel”. Kulturkonflikte und Imperialismus in Asien vom 18. bis zum 20. Jahrhundert (1997) у коауторству са Евом-Маријом Аух (Eva-Maria Auch); Genozid in der modern Geshihte. Jarbuch für historishe Friedensforschung 7 (1999) у коауторству са Герхардом Хиршфелдом (Gerhard Hirschfeld); Great War – Total War. Combat and Mobilization on the Western Front, 1914 –1918, (2000) у коауторству са Роџером Чикерингом (Roger Chickering). [...]
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- Страни утицаји на развој југословенске војне доктрине о оклопним јединицама (1918–1941)
- Summary/Abstract: Yugoslav military doctrine on the use of armored units and defense against them was based on French postulates at the beginning. Then it significantly changed and started to adapt to the actual situation in mid-1940. Unfortunately, this adaptation came too late to influence the thinking of most Yugoslav officers and only under the influence of combat in which German armored and motorized units had the main role and gave the war great maneuverability. The Yugoslav military press and officers were very well informed about all contemporary doctrines and discussions regarding the development of tactics of armored units in the period between the two wars. The General Staff Headquarters stopped the development of Yugoslav doctrine when Army General Dušan T. Simović served as chief. In the period when the doctrine and armament plans were created, Simović held the opinion that the role of armored units in the war to come was overrated. His thinking postponed the purchase of a large number of tanks for the year 1941/1942. Therefore Yugoslav troops entered the war with insufficient training and equipped only with weak tank units and counter-armor cannons of small caliber.
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- Сузбијање качака на Косову и Метохији 1912–1929
- Summary/Abstract: Spreading of the Kačak movement in Kosovo, Metohija and western Macedonia in the first decades of the Yugoslav state was primarily result of the unsolved territorial issues after the period of wars between 1912 and 1918. The Albanian insurgency against the Turkish rule had meanwhile evolved into a powerful instrument of the Austro-Hungarian, Italian, Albanian and Bulgarian policy in the Balkans. The culmination of armed incursions from Albania (1918–1924) took place in an extremely difficult moment for the authority of the newly formed Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Being caught between the legal transitional period it was going through, ethnic tensions in the northwest and heavy fighting with Bulgarian Komitas in the southeast of the country, the Yugoslav state took up tackling the Kačak issue in a quite inapt manner. The situation was aggravated by the anarchy in the aftermath of the war, „innate fright of authorities“, the open border with Albania, the unconsolidated state apparatus, and synchronic activities of the Kačak and Komita movements. However, the Kačaks were partly subdued in 1924 under the circumstances which luckily coincided both at home and abroad (restoration of the Zogu’s regime and normalisation of the Yugoslav-Albanian relations, the assassination of the Kačak leader in Drenica Azem Bejt, the amnesty granted by the Davidovic’s government, etc.). Although the movement lost its vigour and strength, and their ideologist left the country, the problem eventually turned to have been merely postponed. The failure to eradicate the Albanian insurgency may be explained in the light of the wide-spread tribal solidarity among Kosovo’s Albanians, the power of the ideas on Greater Albania, and political trade of surviving landowners (beys) oligarchy with the Radical Party leaders, which eventually led to the outbreak of Albanian irredentism shortly before the World War II.
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- Тенковске јединице у Војсци Краљевине Југославије (1930–1941)
- Summary/Abstract: Excluding the countries defeated in the World War I, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was among the last to form its tank units (1930). Although the first tank unit was established some four years before Wehrmacht tank unit, the development of this branch was much slower in the Yugoslav Army than in the German Army. The main reasons were inability to procure adequate armor fighting vehicles from abroad and non-existence of domestic industries capable of independent production, but also a lack of awareness with people whose influence was crucial for the development of the Yugoslav Army of the importance of this combat means in a future war. The first serious development plan, made by division general Milan Dj. Nedić, appeared relatively early, in 1932. Made in accordance with the French model, and in line with the French doctrine postulates, this plan, with some less significant modifications, was the main source of ideas for the development of the armor units in the Yugoslav Army. Even it had been implemented, the question remains whether the achievement of the Yugoslav Army would have been any better, for the organization that followed the French model proved ineffective in the spring 1940. Yugoslavia lacked trained personnel to enlarge formations of tank units. The accelerated training provided in 1940 was not sufficient to prepare the officer cadre, let alone to provide sufficient number of noncommissioned officers and soldiers, so that even with the procurement plans completely implemented the Yugoslav Army would have faced the same problem. Considering all this, the results of Yugoslav tank units in combat actions against the enemy who surpassed them in technology, number and tactics could have been easily predicted.